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Chapter 1
General Introduction
People constantly mimic each other’s postures, behaviors, facial expressions,
speech manner and a lot more. If I were to present this orally to you and suddenly
look surprised, you will look surprised too. Maybe you have experienced it yourself,
that you scratched your face wondering why you did that, because it did not itch, and
then suddenly became aware that your interaction partner scratched him- or herself.
This mimicry is automatic and happens all around us; you mimic and are mimicked,
but why?
Baumeister and Leary (1995) have argued that people have a basic need to
belong; they are motivated to form and maintain relationships with other people. It is
plausible that mimicry can have a significant role in the bonding process, for mimicry
appears to have a lot of positive consequences for us.
Literature about mimicry is extensive, however, existing studies focused on
single effects of mimicry, lacking a comprehensive investigation with an overarching
theory. In the present dissertation, I want to provide insights by more thoroughly
investigating and relating benefits of mimicry to each other within a social approach
to mimicry. In addition, I take a first step in creating an overarching theory by
defining important factors that can predict limitations of mimicry.
Before elaborating on this, I will provide a definition of mimicry, give an
overview of evidence on the existence of the phenomenon as such (do people mimic?)
and its origins (why do people mimic?), which includes a description of research on
the consequences of mimicry (what do we already know?).  Then, I will elaborate on
what needs further attention and will be explored in the present dissertation (the
present thesis). Finally, I will give an overview of the four empirical chapters of the
present dissertation.
Mimicry
Although it was intuitively observed by Adam Smith as early as 1759,
mimicry itself was first described by Lipps (1907). He proposed that mimicking
movements in postures, vocal and facial expressions creates inner cues, which leads,
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via afferent feedback (from the muscle-movements to the brain), to experiencing what
the other person is feeling. Lipps called this ‘objective motor mimicry’.
In this dissertation, mimicry is defined broadly as ‘doing what others are
doing’.  This ‘doing’ can be verbal or nonverbal behaviors and expressions, like
words, accents, speech rates, postures, gestures, and facial expressions. Mimicry of
these verbal and nonverbal behaviors and expressions can either be conscious (also
referred to as imitation), for instance like children intentionally copy behaviors to
learn how to use a fork. But lots of mimicry also occurs unconsciously and
automatically.
Do people mimic?
Evidence for the existence and, at the same time for the automaticity of
mimicry, stems from developmental, neurological, and social psychological research.
First, developmental researchers have found newborns and very young infants to
imitate eye blinking, vocal sound (Kugiumutzakis, 1996), facial gestures like tongues
sticking (Meltzoff, 1988; Reissland, 1988), and emotional facial expressions, like
happiness and anger (O’Toole & Dubin, 1968; Haviland & Lelwica, 1987). Mimicry
has even been observed by a newborn being on earth for no more than 42 minutes
(Meltzoff & Moore 1983, 1989), which provides further support for the notion that
mimicry is an innate tendency.
The existence of the innate link between observed and executed action is also
strengthened by neurological evidence on mirror neurons. The same neurons within a
monkeys brain become active when observing action or when executing this same
action (for an overview see Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2002). In addition,
related findings in humans also demonstrate that common brain areas serve both
perception and execution of actions (e.g., Decety, et al 1994, 1997; Decety,
Chaminade, Grèzes, & Meltzoff, 2002), providing evidence that there is a close link
between perceiving and doing, as was already hypothesized by James (1890). This
hypothesis was also supported by Berger and Hadley (1975); they demonstrated that
forearm muscle tension increased when watching arm wrestling.
Further evidence for the existence and automaticity of mimicry comes from
social psychologists. People spontaneously and rapidly react to facial stimuli with
distinct facial electromyographic reactions in the face as a function of the facial
expression of the stimuli (Dimberg, 1990), reflecting the existence of facial mimicry.
This mimicry occurs even when the stimuli are presented outside of conscious
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awareness (Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000). Other evidence comes from
Chartrand and Bargh (1999) demonstrating that unconscious behavioral mimicry
occurs even among strangers in the most minimal circumstances.
Next to facial and behavioral mimicry, people are also known to mimic
vocally; Capella and Planalp (1981) demonstrated that over time, people in interaction
came to match one another’s conversational rhythms; meaning that they talked the
same amount, and had an equal pausing duration. In addition, people have a tendency
to imitate other speech patterns as well, like speech rate (Webb, 1972), pitch, and
duration of utterance in conversations (Buder, 1991). In addition, Berger, Carli,
Hammersla, Karshmer, and Sanchez (1979) showed people mimic gestures and sign
language.
Why do people mimic?
There are different proposed functions of mimicry. From a developmental
approach, mimicry is proposed to serve a function in social and empathic
development. When looking at the evidence for this proposed function, Meltzoff and
Moore (1994) showed that infants use imitation to communicate with persons they
have seen before and to recognize those persons in a next encounter.  They conclude
mimicry to be “an important engine in infants’ developing understanding of persons”.
There are also indications that nonverbal mimicry is important in social coordination
before language is acquired (Eckerman, Davis, & Diwow, 1989). That children can
use mimicry to shape and modulate their environment is also supported by Bates
(1975); children who imitated basketball coaches received more positive
reinforcements.
In clinical settings, mimicry is proposed to foster understanding and have
beneficial effects for the therapeutic relationship and the patient’s health. However, to
this date there is no empirical evidence that mimicry exerts a causal effect on these
variables. Evidence that mimicry may benefit the therapeutic relationship has come
from Capella (1981): Congruency in body movements and mirror-imaged postures are
positively related to perceptions of affiliation and verbal disclosure. In addition,
congruency in posture between two people has been demonstrated to positively relate
to a more positive, interpersonal, specific, and bound evaluation of the therapeutic
session (Charney, 1966). A well-known study by Scheflen (1964) indicated that
congruency of postures in psychotherapy groups positively relates to sharing
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ideological positions. However, these studies were all correlational, so no causal
conclusions can be drawn.
Social approaches to mimicry propose that mimicry has beneficial effects for
all relationships and serves to create bonds between people (Van Baaren, Maddux,
Chartrand, De Bouter, & Van Knippenberg, 2003; Van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami,
& Van Knippenberg, 2004; Cheng & Chartrand, 2003; Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, &
Chartrand, 2003). Humans are social animals (e.g. Aronson, 1999; Ehrlich, 2002;
Wright, 1994) and benefit from forming and maintaining bonds with other people (see
Ainsworth, 1989; Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Barash, 1977; Bowlby, 1969; Buss,
1990, 1991; Hogan, Jones & Cheek, 1985; Moreland, 1987). Mimicry can play an
important role in bonding processes. Chartrand and Bargh (1999) provided some
evidence for this view, showing that participants, when being behaviorally mimicked,
rated the interaction as smoother and evaluated their interaction partner more
positively. This result has been demonstrated in different contexts, showing its
robustness (Bates, 1975; Capella, 1993; Manusov, 1993). Interpersonal interactions
also benefit from posture mirroring; it has been found to positively relate to rapport
(LaFrance, 1979; Bernieri, 1988; Bernieri & Rosenthal, 1991) and involvement in the
classroom (LaFrance & Broadbent, 1976). Finally, mimicry increases prosocial
behavior; participants who were being mimicked were more helpful and generous
towards the mimicker and to other people in general, compared with participants who
had not been mimicked (Van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, & Van Knippenberg,
2004).
So what do we already know?
 In sum, mimicry is an automatic process that can serve social and empathic
development and has benefits for bonding processes. When looking at evidence for
the social functions of mimicry, correlational studies showed that posture congruency
is related to more verbal disclosure, affiliation, rapport, involvement and more
positive and personal interactions. Experimental studies on behavioral mimicry show
that people who are being mimicked rated the interaction as smoother and show more
prosocial behavior. In addition, mimicry of behaviors, movements and smiles leads to
a more positive evaluation of mimickers.
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The present thesis
The present studies are based on the social approach to mimicry. Because
there is accumulating evidence that mimicry is an innate and automatic tendency,
mimicry thus should have enhanced, and perhaps still even enhances, chances of
survival and reproduction. An influential determinant of physical survival is,
according to Buss and Kenrick (1998), successful social interactions with other
people. In addition, group living may have been, and still can be, a significant
component in survival and reproduction (Brewer, 1997; Caporael & Brewer, 1991).
So only those individuals who have been successful in forming and maintaining
positive relationships with others survived and passed on their genes. Therefore I
think, it is highly plausible that the evolutionary heritage to mimic may have had, and
still has, benefits for survival, thus for forming and maintaining positive relationships
with others.
The extant work on mimicry focuses on single, isolated effects of mimicry,
lacking a comprehensive investigation on support and relations between different
social benefits of mimicry. The mimicry-literature lacks an overarching theory that
can predict mimicry processes and effects. So first, I want to provide insights by more
thoroughly investigating and relating social benefits of mimicry to each other. If
mimicry has social functions, mimickees as well as mimickers should benefit from
this. Although a benefit for mimickers is that they are evaluated more positively,
mimickers themselves have never been the primary reference of investigation.
Therefore, it remains unclear what social consequences mimickers themselves
experience.
I argue that empathic processes between people are the basis for creating
bonds; When being empathic and feeling empathized with, people may feel
connected, and an important foundation may be laid for liking and other bonding
processes. Because the face is an important communicator of one’s feelings,
especially facial mimicry can play an important role in these empathic processes, and
thus in creating bonds between people. Therefore in this present dissertation the social
functions of mimicry are investigated using facial mimicry. However, there has not
been much attention to empathic processes due to mimicry. Though mimicry is
hypothesized to be the mechanism behind catching other people’s emotions
(Adelmann & Zajonc, 1989; Hatfield, Cacioppo & Rapson, 1992; Izard, 1971; Laird,
1984; Lipps, 1907; Tomkins, 1963) and to communicate understanding (Rogers,
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1957), this is not supported by empirical evidence yet. If true, this means that mimicry
can help feeling what others are feeling and also communicate this to the other person,
who in turn feels understood, which is important in bonding processes. So in Part I of
this dissertation, I investigate the social functions of mimicry by examining its social
consequences; first attention is given to the social consequences of mimicry for
mimickers, and secondly I focus on empathic processes in interactions between
mimicker and mimickee.
In Part II of the present thesis, I proceed my investigation on the social
functions of mimicry by examining its limitations. I believe that because mimicry had
direct or indirect service for creating bonds between people, which is important in
survival, only individuals with the tendency to mimic others survived and reproduced
their genes. This does not mean, however, that mimicry has benefits in every single
situation. I argue that mimicry only has benefits in social contexts, in which mimicry
originally served its function. This will be investigated in Part II, where qualifiers on
the consequences of mimicry are investigated in situations where (a) mimicry does
not have (in)direct social benefits, and (b) mimicry even has disadvantages for
bonding processes.
Below, I give an overview of the four empirical chapters. These chapters can
be read independently from the rest of the dissertation. At the same time, this implies
that parts of the introductions of the empirical chapters may have some overlap.
Overview of the empirical chapters
Part I: On the social consequences of facial mimicry
Chapter 2: Social consequences for the mimicker
This chapter focuses on the social consequences of mimicry on the side of the
mimicker. First, it will be investigated whether mimicry plays an important role in
catching the emotions of other people. Next to the influence of mimicry on this
affective form of empathy, effects two other empathy-related processes, cognitive
empathy and understanding, are tested. As I have argued, these empathic processes
should in turn affect bonding-related processes, like similarity and liking. So first, we
test whether mimicking another person influences similarity towards and liking for the
mimickee. Then interrelations between these consequences are examined, where we
expect empathy-related processes to lead to bonding processes.
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Chapter 3: Empathic processes between mimickers and mimickees
In Chapter 3 I will focus on empathic processes between mimickers and
mimickees in interaction. At present we do not know whether social beneficial effects
of mimicry occur in simple every-day interactions between people and how the effects
on perceivers and targets emerge in real interactions, where the thoughts, feelings and
behaviors of both are continuously and dynamically effected by each other. In Study
3.1 we therefore created a real interaction situation between 2 participants, which
allows us to examine whether 2 people actually experience the same emotions. In
Study 3.2 we investigate whether these empathic feelings activated by mimicry are
also communicated to the mimickee, which has not been tested to this date. In
addition, two other benefits of mimicry, interpersonal closeness and smoothness of the
interaction, are more thoroughly examined.
Part II: Qualifiers on the consequences of mimicry
After a thorough investigation on the social functions of mimicry by
examining its social consequences, I further examine its functions by discriminating
qualifiers on the social consequences of mimicry. By showing limitations on the
effects of mimicry, more information is provided about the social functions mimicry
is assumed to serve.
Chapter 4: When mimicry does not have (in)direct social benefits
If effects of mimicry emerge primarily in settings where mimicry can
potentially serve its social functions, the consequences of mimicry should be reduced
when mimicry does not have (in)direct social benefits. This means that empathic
effects due to mimicry might be reduced when people perceive emotional expressions
knowing that emotions are not really experienced by the target. In these cases there is
no point in empathizing with the person, because the social function to empathize is
reduced. In Study 4.1, we want to test the hypothesis that, when perceivers assume
that emotions are acted, i.e., when the expressions to be imitated are not seen as real,
imitating these expressions does not have the same effects on empathy than when
imitating expressions perceived as real, using a scene from a reality soap, about
which, at the time the study was running, there was some debate regarding whether
the actors were 'themselves' or were acting. In Study 4.2, we manipulate perceived
realness of emotions directly.
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Chapter 5: When mimicry has negative effects for bonding processes
The consequences of mimicry should not only be reduced when mimicry does
not have (in)direct social benefits, but even when mimicry has negative consequences
for bonding processes. When creating bonds between people, it is important that
people like each other, because only then relationships can be positive, significant,
and lasting. Therefore we argue that is not functional to form a relationship with
someone you dislike.
So first, we hypothesize that the automatic tendency to mimic should be
reduced when you dislike someone. In Study 5.1 we test this by manipulating a priori
liking and measure the amount of mimicry. To make sure that the results also apply to
situations were participants had naturally formed an impression, we conducted Study
5.2, in which amount of mimicry was measured towards an unknown target belonging
to a negatively stereotyped group compared to a target not belonging to a group which
participants had negative attitudes of.
Secondly we hypothesize that, because it is not functional to create bonds with
people you dislike, mimicking a disliked person should not enhance liking for this
person, which is explored in Study 5.3. In addition, we argue that this function rule
only applies to the active person, i.e. the mimicker, in that situation, so in Study 5.4
we created a situation with conflicting social functions of mimicry; where mimicry is
dysfunctional for the mimickee, while being functional for the mimicker. In contrast
to Study 5.3, we expect mimicry to enhance liking for the disliked person, when this
disliked person is the mimicker in this situation.
PART I
On the social consequences of facial mimicry

Chapter 2
Social consequences for the mimicker
Mimicry is all around us: you mimic and you are mimicked. For instance,
when you look around, you may see two people talking to each other in the same
postures, and smiles being returned by smiles. Or, when your interaction partner
becomes emotional, and looks sad, you may start looking sad as well. Another
example is a mother mimicking her baby: the mother opens her mouth when her baby
opens its mouth to be fed; this is not because the mother wants to show the baby what
to do; the behavior occurs after the baby opens its mouth and not when the baby does
not open its mouth. So, people constantly mimic one another. Why? If this process is
so omnipresent, it may have social functions1. What could these be?
One possible social function of mimicry is empathy and better understanding.
Through mimicry, one may be able to empathize more with another person, and
understand the person better. A good understanding of others enhances the
predictability of their behavior, and thus has adaptive value (e.g., Fiske, 1992).
Another possible function follows from the need to belong. Baumeister and
Leary (1995) have argued that humans have a basic need to bond with others and feel
accepted by others. Mimicry could facilitate the formation and maintenance of
satisfying personal relationships in several ways. For the mimicker, it could enhance
liking through feelings of similarity and enhanced understanding. The person being
mimicked, in turn, may feel better understood and feel that the mimicker is paying
attention, which enhances liking for the mimicker. Thus, mimicry may smoothen the
interaction and may enhance a sense of relatedness among interaction partners.
Empathy and understanding
Through mimicry, one may be able to better empathize with and understand
another person. Some researchers see empathy as a cognitive process (Deutsch &
Madle, 1975; Mead, 1934; Underwood & Moore, 1982). These researchers define
empathy as perspective taking or role taking. Other researchers define empathy as a
primarily affective process; it entails emotional responsiveness to the feelings
                                                 
 This chapter is based on Stel & Vonk (2004)
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experienced by others, in the sense that the observer feels the same emotion as the
target person  (Bryant, 1987; Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987; Feshbach, 1978; Hoffman,
1984). Still others view empathy as involving shared affect as well as cognitive
processes (Davis, 1994; Katz, 1963; Kohut 1959). In our studies, both forms of
empathy will be examined.
Affective empathy.
 Emotions are contagious; people have a tendency to catch other people’s
emotions (Hatfield, Cacioppo & Rapson, 1992), like joy (Leventhal & Mace, 1970),
fear (Kerckhoff & Back, 1968), depression (Teoh, Soewondo, & Sidhartha, 1975),
and anger (Reay, 1960). Neumann and Strack (2000) found evidence for vocal mood
contagion; emotional vocal expressions of a target induced congruent mood states in
listeners. In their second study they demonstrated that participants who had repeated
the speech of the target, rated the target as more happy or sad, congruent to the
repeated vocal expression. However, it remains uninvestigated whether mimicry is
responsible for the congruent mood state in the mimicker.
Lips already proposed in 1907 that empathy is due to an automatic motor
mimicry response to another’s expression of affect, and that via nonverbal feedback
people receive from their own facial expressions or bodily postures, emotions are
caught. So affective empathy (emotional contagion) is proposed to be mediated by
mimicry. Similarly, later authors (Adelmann & Zajonc, 1989; Izard, 1971; Laird,
1984; Tomkins, 1963) view emotional contagion as a two-step process. First, mimicry
occurs automatically and unconsciously. When you look at someone’s face, you
automatically mimic the expression. The second step in the process is facial, vocal,
and posture feedback. In case of facial feedback, Darwin (1872/1965), Izard (1977)
and Tomkins (1982) have proposed that the experience of emotions is affected by
feedback from the muscles that are activated in the face (see Hess, Kappas, McHugo,
Lanzetta & Kleck, 1992 for empirical evidence). This feedback mechanism applies to
postures and vocal processes as well.
Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson (1992) even included mimicry in their
definition of primitive emotional contagion: “the tendency to automatically mimic and
synchronize movements, expressions, postures, and vocalizations with those of
another person and, consequently to converge emotionally”. However, it has never
been shown empirically that there is a direct link between mimicry of facial
expressions and emotional contagion. Gump and Kulik (1997), Blairy, Herrera, and
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Hess (1999) and Hess and Blairy (2001) failed to find a causal relation between
mimicry and emotional contagion. We suggest that this is because all of these studies
relied on static (photographs, Gump & Kulik, 1997; Blairy, Herrera & Hess, 1999) or
very brief stimulus materials (15 seconds; Hess & Blairy, 2001).
We argue that these stimuli are not sufficient to produce empathy towards the
mimicked person, in the way they do in real life. If one wants to investigate emotional
contagion as a function of mimicry, one has to investigate it in ecologically valid
settings, i.e., in settings where mimicry has a social function. In our study, therefore,
we use longer stimulus materials, that allow participants to gradually "get into" the
target person's emotions; we present participants with video fragments of a target
person talking to a therapist. We hypothesize that imitation of facial expressions
during the video will directly lead to more contagion of the target's emotions
(affective empathy), compared with no mimicry (Hypothesis 1).
Cognitive empathy.
Studies about mimicry and empathy all concern affective empathy, except for
Chartrand and Bargh’s study (1999, study 3), in which they demonstrated a link
between mimicry and cognitive empathy. The researchers showed that dispositionally
empathic individuals mimic to a greater extent than other people. However, it remains
unexplored whether the amount of mimicry affects cognitive empathy towards a
specific target person.
Through mimicry, one comes to stand in the other’s shoes, which enhances
perspective taking. We thus hypothesize that imitation leads to more cognitive
empathy compared with no mimicry (Hypothesis 2). In addition, we expect that
affective empathy influences cognitive empathy; when one catches the emotions of
another person, one should be better able to adopt the other’s perspective (Hypothesis
3a). Conversely, we also think that emotions are more strongly caught when one takes
the other’s perspective (Hypothesis 3b).  Thus, we hypothesize that both forms of
empathy reinforce one another.
Understanding.
To understand someone, means to understand the causes of a person’s
behavior. This way, one can explain behaviors and emotions of others. It allows one
to predict other’s behavioral and emotional responses, and to act on this sense of
understanding. We propose that mimicry could facilitate this process. Although there
is a common intuitive notion that mimicry could enhance understanding, no previous
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studies have directly investigated the influence of mimicry on understanding, as noted
by Hess, Philippot, and Blairy, 1999. Blairy et al (1999) and Hess and Blairy (2001)
investigated a related process, namely, emotion recognition. In these studies, no
relation between mimicry and recognition accuracy were found. Stel and Van
Knippenberg (2002) did show that mimicry affected emotion recognition, using
reaction times. Therefore, we think the related process of understanding may also be
influenced by mimicry; so we hypothesize that imitation of facial expressions
influences the understanding experienced by participants: When expressions are
mimicked, participants will report more feelings of understanding compared with no
mimicry conditions (Hypothesis 4a). We further assume that this effect is mediated by
cognitive empathy (Hypothesis 4b): When you come to stand in the shoes of another
person, you take the perspective of the person; as a result, a sense of enhanced
understanding may emerge.
Bonding
Mimicry could result in feeling more connected with one another. As noted
earlier, this effect could occur on both sides of the interaction, but in this research we
focus on the mimicker.
Similarity.
When facial expressions are mimicked, the emotional and cognitive state of the
target person and the mimicker may become similar. This could influence the
perceived similarity between the two. So, we expect that perceivers who mimic facial
expressions will report more similarity with the target than perceivers who do not
mimic (Hypothesis 5). Gump and Kulik (1997) suggested that mimicry may increase
coherence between interaction partners by making them more similar to one another.
In addition, Bailenson and Yee (2005) demonstrated that mimicry leads to more
attitude similarity. But it has never been tested whether people actually feel more
similar to each other as a result of mimicry.
Liking.
In addition, we assume that mimicry results in more liking for the target
(hypothesis 6). Previous studies, showing that mimicry and 'rapport' are positively
related (i.e. Bernieri, 1988; LaFrance, 1979), have been correlational, so no causal
effects of mimicry have been tested so far. Chartrand and Bargh were one of the few
who did manipulate mimicry in their studies, and found that liking and smoothness of
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the interaction was enhanced. The difference with our study is that, in the study of
Chartrand and Bargh, a confederate mimicked the behavior of the participant, who as
a result liked the confederate more. In our study, the participants themselves were the
ones who mimicked. So we test a different hypothesis, namely that mimicking –
rather than being mimicked – produces more liking for the target. Van Baaren,
Holland, Kawakami and Van Knippenberg (in press) following up on Chartrand and
Bargh’s work, found that persons being mimicked become more pro-social in general.
At present, the explanation for these findings is unclear, but we suggest that mimicry
produces a sense of being “in sync” with someone, which in turn satisfies people’s
fundamental need for relatedness (e.g., Ryan, Sheldon, Kasser, & Deci, 1996).
Possibly, this effect emerges automatically. If so, it is conceivable that mimicry, even
when done intentionally, has the same effects on the mimicker, and hence produces
more liking for the person being mimicked. This important component of the
relationship between mimicry and liking has not been examined previously.
An additional question that has not yet been addressed is what precisely
mediates the effects of mimicry on liking. A possibility is that liking effects are not a
direct result of mimicry itself, but are mediated by felt understanding and cognitive
empathy (cf. Arriaga & Rusbult, 1998), and by feelings of similarity (cf. Byrne,
1971). Arriaga and Rusbult (1998) demonstrated that empathy resulted in less
negative behavior attributions in situations in which conflicts could arise. So, mimicry
could result in more liking for the person being mimicked due to empathic feelings.
Mimicry could also result in more liking as a result of the perception of similarity,
because we like similar others more than individuals who are less similar (Byrne,
1971). In addition, this enhanced liking, in turn, should influence mimicry, because it
has been demonstrated that liking for a target influences the amount of mimicked
behaviors (Stel, Van Baaren, Blascovich, McCall, & Vonk, 2005). These possibilities
will be examined in this chapter as well.
Emotions are expressed by verbal and nonverbal communication. We assume
that the effects hypothesized are due to mimicry of nonverbal facial expressions of
emotions. However, it is possible that explicit instructions to imitate or not imitate, as
given in our study, have a differential influence on the attention to verbal information
of the video, which could (partially) produce the predicted effects. To address this
possibility, we include the variable Information in our study; half of the participants
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receive verbal and nonverbal information (sound and vision), while the other half only
receives nonverbal information (vision only). This allows us to examine, in addition,
if emotional contagion is stronger when receiving verbal information as well.
Study 2.1
Method
Participants and design
Participants were 181 (74 male and 107 female) students at the Radboud
University Nijmegen. Their age ranged from 17 to 39 years, with an average of 21.3.
They participated for payment (€2,-). They were randomly assigned to the conditions
of a 3 (Imitation; yes vs. no vs. control) x 2 (Video; happy vs. sad) x 2 (Information:
sound + vision vs. vision only) between-subjects factorial design. Males and females
were counterbalanced across conditions.
Procedure
The study was run individually. Participants were told that they were going to
watch a video, but would first work their way through some papers. These included a
confidentiality consent form, background information about the video and, in the
imitation and no imitation condition, Imitation instructions (see Materials). The
experimenter emphasized the importance of these instructions in advance. She also
demonstrated how to start and stop the video player and showed the participants the
questionnaire, to be filled out after seeing the video. After asking if there were any
questions, the experimenter left the room and participants could go through the
experiment at their own pace.
Participants were recorded while watching the video in order to check whether
the instructions were carried out2.
Materials
Video. All participants saw a film of three-and-a-half minutes of a young
woman (an actress), named Marije, who acted that she was talking with her therapist.
Participants were told that they would see fragments of the therapy session, in which
the questions and comments by the therapist had been cut from the video. The video
consisted of four fragments. Depending on the video condition, participants saw
Marije talking about a happy event or a sad event. On the happy video, she talked
about meeting her current boyfriend; she was very happy and excited and she laughed
and smiled talking about specific events. On the sad video, she talked about finding
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out that her father had Parkinson’s disease; her facial expression was sad. She did not
cry, but at the end she was not far from it and was suppressing her tears. On both
videos, only the face and part of the shoulders were visible.
Half of the participants saw a video with sound and vision, the other half saw
the same videos, except that we muted it; participants only saw the nonverbal
expressions of the target and did not hear her voice.
Papers. Participants were asked to sign a confidentiality consent form to agree
that the information they would receive during this experiment would be treated
confidentially. We used this consent form to back up our cover story that the woman
on the video was treated by a therapist.
The background information informed participants that the video consisted of
short fragments and that the comments of the therapist were left out. Additionally,
some background information was given which differed depending on Video
condition. Both descriptions read that Marije’s father had Parkinson’s disease and that
she was going through a difficult period. In the sad video condition, participants were
informed that the video was about the moment that Marije’s father told her about his
disease. In the happy video condition, the background information read that Marije
was starting to pick up life again, and that the video was about meeting a new
boyfriend.
One third of the participants received an instruction to imitate the facial
expressions that the woman would display on the video, one third received an
instruction not to imitate the expressions, while the other third did not receive an
instruction. The instructions of imitation and no imitation were very specific and
matched for content. For instance, both groups received instructions to pay attention
to specific movements of eyes, eyebrows, and mouth, but one group was instructed to
imitate them and one group not to. Participants in these conditions were also told to
remind themselves of the instructions throughout the video.
The questionnaire contained, respectively, three questions concerning
cognitive empathy (Did you take the perspective of Marije? Were you involved with
the story that Marije told? Did you place yourself in Marije’s shoes?), one about
similarity feelings (Do you think you have much in common with Marije?), two about
liking (Did you like Marije? Do you think you would get along with Marije?), and one
about understanding (Did you understand Marije?). Subsequently, emotional
contagion was measured by 11 emotion items, on which participants indicated how
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happy, sad, or angry they felt during the video3. The emotions were: tense,
enthusiastic, pleased, worried, irritated, angry, confused, cheerful, dreary, happy, and
sad.
To examine whether perceived affect of the target plays a role in the assumed
effects of imitation on affective empathy, these same emotion items were used to
measure the perceived affect of the target; participants had to indicate how happy, sad,
or angry they thought Marije felt. The order of the emotion ratings for self and target
was balanced. For all questions, 7-point Likert scales were used.
At the end of the questionnaire, participants in the imitation and no imitation
conditions were asked how difficult they thought the instruction was and to what
extent it had affected their attention to the video. In an open-ended question, all
participants were asked if they knew what the experiment was about. Finally,
background variables were assessed.
Results
Three participants (1 male and 2 female) did not believe in the authenticity of
the video material. They were in different conditions (imitation, sad video, sound +
vision; no imitation, happy video, sound + vision; and no imitation, sad video, only
vision). Analyses including these participants yielded somewhat weaker effects. They
were excluded in the analyses below. Because Sex of participant did not produce any
significant effects, it was discarded from the analyses below.
Participants in imitation conditions rated the Imitation instruction as
significantly more difficult (M = 4.34, SD = 1.25) than participants in no imitation
conditions (M = 3.05, SD = 1.72), F (1, 117) = 22.04, p = .00. There was no difference
between these two conditions on rated attention, F (1, 117) = 1.87, p = .17.
Manipulation check
To check whether participants carried out the instructions, we coded the facial
expressions of all participants, and compared these with the facial expressions of the
target person. First, the videos of the target person were coded, using event sampling,
i.e., a facial movement was coded whenever it was observed. Next, we further
developed the coding system for the expressions of the participants, so that it included
all relevant expressions and movements that the target person had shown. All
observed behaviors fell into 6 broad categories, namely: blinking, changes in direction
of gaze, movements of eyebrows, mouth, nose, and head movements. These
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categories each consisted of more specific subcategories, for example, in the mouth
category; laughing with mouth closed, with mouth open, yawning, licking lips, biting
lips, stiffening lips. Coders had to rate when each of these behaviors was observed.
Three Independent raters coded the facial expressions of the participants.
Interobserver reliability, using alpha statistics, of the variable ‘amount of mimicry’
ranged between .97 and .98. Subsequently, the behaviors of the target person were
matched with the behaviors of the participants, using time blocks of 10 seconds.
When the behavior of the participant matched the behavior of the target and occurred
after the target’s behavior within a time block, it was scored as a mimicry behavior.
The instruction to mimic or not to mimic produced a general tendency towards
more vs. less facial movement, F (2, 115) = 37.55, p = .00. This could bias our results:
When one has a general tendency to move a lot, the amount of mimicry increases,
however, this is a side effect of overall movement. Therefore, we express the amount
of mimicry as the proportion of mimicked behaviors out of all the participant's facial
movements. A 3 (Imitation; yes vs. no vs. control) univariate analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with this index as a dependent variable4, showed that the Imitation
instructions effected actual mimicry, F (2, 115) = 15.97, p = .00. Participants who
were instructed to imitate the target’s facial expressions, mimicked the target more (M
= 39.03 %) than participants who did not receive an instruction (M = 24.22 %), F (1,
83) = 8.75, p = .00. Participants who were instructed not to mimic, showed less
mimicry (M = 10.61 %) than those in the control condition (M = 24.22%), F (1, 80) =
8.80, p = .00. The imitation and no imitation condition also differed significantly, F
(1, 67) = 38.70, p = .00.
Affective empathy
The items of the emotion scale can be classified into three core emotions:
happiness, sadness, and anger. For each emotion, we took the set with the highest
Cronbach's alpha. The final set for happiness consist of enthusiastic, pleased, cheerful,
and happy (α = .90); for sadness: worried, dreary, and sad (α = .83); for anger only
the item angry was used5.
The order of the questions about perceiver’s vs. target’s affect did not produce
any significant effects; it was discarded from the analyses below.
A 3 (Imitation; yes vs. no vs. control) x 2 (Video; happy vs. sad) x 3
(Emotion: happiness vs. sadness vs. anger) x 2 (Information: sound + vision vs. vision
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only) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted with participants’
emotion as a within-subjects factor.
A main effect of Emotion, F (2, 165) = 234.23, p = .00, indicated that
participants in all conditions were less angry (M = 1.66, SD = 0.96) than happy (M =
3.64, SD = 1.46), t (1, 177) = 13. 78, p = .00 or sad (M = 3.12, SD = 1.50), t (1, 177) =
14. 30, p = .00. The difference between happiness and sadness was also significant, t
(1, 177) = 2.66, p = .01.
This main effect was qualified by Video, demonstrating an overall emotional
contagion effect, F (2, 165) = 89.49; p = .00. Participants reported being more happy
(M = 4.55, SD = 1.27) and less sad (M = 2.14, SD = 0.93) and angry (M = 1.40, SD =
0.65) when they saw the video with the happy event compared to the video with the
sad event; in the sad video condition participants felt more sadness (M = 4.10, SD =
1.30) than happiness (M = 2.72, SD = 1.00) and anger (M = 1.92, SD = 1.30).
As predicted (Hypothesis 1), this emotional contagion effect was qualified by
Imitation, F (4, 330) = 2.84; p = .03. The pertinent means and contrast tests are
presented in Table 2.1.
Simple effects showed that, in the happy video condition, Imitation affected
feelings of happiness, F (2, 86) = 5.61; p = .01, and not feelings of sadness, or anger
(Fs < 1): participants reported less feelings of happiness when they did not imitate the
expressions of the target (M = 3.92, SD = 1.40) than when they did (M = 4.83, SD =
1.18), F (1, 58) = 7.51, p = .01 or than in the control condition, where they did not
receive an Imitation instruction (M = 4.85, SD = 1.02), F (1, 55) = 8.30, p = .01. The
difference between the imitation and control condition was not significant, F < 1.
In the condition with the sad video, Imitation affected only feelings of sadness,
F (2, 86) = 6.70; p = .00, and not feelings of happiness, F (2, 86) = 1.72, p = .19, or
anger, F < 1: participants reported less sadness when they did not imitate the facial
expressions of the woman on the video (M = 3.45, SD = 1.20) than when these
expressions were imitated (M = 4.58, SD = 1.08), F (1, 57) = 14.57, p = .00, or when
they did not receive an Imitation instruction (M = 4.27, SD = 1.37), F (1, 57) = 5.95, p
= .02. The difference between the imitation and control condition was not significant,
F < 1. Later in this section, we will discuss the mediating role of actual mimicry in
these effects.
There were no significant effects involving Information, F < 1. Thus, Imitation
influenced experienced affect regardless whether the sound was on or off. 6
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Table 2.1. Means and standard deviations of perceivers’ feelings of happiness,
sadness and anger by Imitation for the happy and sad video (1 = totally not, 7 = very
strong).
Video Imitation Dependent variable: emotions
happiness
M           SD
sadness
M           SD
anger
M           SD
imitation 4.83a 1.18 2.06 a 0.98 1.41 a 0.76
no imitation 3.92 b 1.40 2.14 a 0.73 1.50 a 0.69
control 4.85 a 1.02 2.22 a 1.06 1.31 a 0.47
happy video
total 4.55 1.27 2.14 0.93 1.40 0.65
imitation 2.99 c 0.96 4.58 b 1.08 1.83 b 0.95
no imitation 2.59 c 0.98 3.45 c 1.20 1.83 b 1.04
control 2.57 c 1.03 4.27 b 1.37 2.10 b 1.40
sad video
total 2.72 1.00 4.10 1.30 1.92 1.14
Note Means with noncommon subscripts differ significantly (p < .05) within each
column.
Cognitive empathy, understanding, similarity and liking
Cronbach's alpha for the three questions about cognitive empathy was .86; for
the two questions on liking it was .84.
A 3 (Imitation; yes vs. no vs. control) x 2 (Video; happy vs. sad) x 2
(Information: sound + vision vs. vision only) MANOVA was conducted on cognitive
empathy, understanding, similarity feelings, and liking. Hypotheses 2, 4a, 5, and 6 all
predict a main effect of Imitation on these variables. This main effect was significant
for cognitive empathy, F (2, 166) = 13.67; p = .00, understanding, F (2, 166) = 3.86, p
= .02, similarity feelings, F (2, 166) = 7.38; p = .00, and liking, F (2, 166) = 6.46; p =
.00. Table 2.2 presents cell means and contrast tests.
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Table 2.2. Means and standard deviations on perspective taking, understanding,
similarity feelings and liking in imitation, no imitation and control condition (the
higher the scores, the more perspective, the more understanding, the more similarity,
and the more liking).
cognitive
empathy
M           SD
felt
understanding
M           SD
felt
similarity
M           SD
liking
M           SD
imitation 4.58a 1.14 5.01 a 1.14 2.98 a 1.40 4.98 a 0.84
no imitation 3.70 b 1.25 4.61 a 1.33 2.23 b 1.13 4.22 b 1.21
control 4.73 a 1.24 5.07 a 1.32 3.07 a 1.45 4.92 a 1.11
Note Means with noncommon subscripts differ significantly (p < .05) within each
column.
As can be seen, the effects are generally due to the no imitation condition. For
cognitive empathy, similarity and liking the differences between imitation and no
imitation, and also between no imitation and the control condition are significant,
whereas there are no significant differences between imitation and the control
condition. Thus, when participants did not mimic the expressions of the woman on the
video, cognitive empathy was reduced (M = 3.70, SD =1.25), participants felt less
similar toward the target (M = 2.23, SD = 1.13) and liked the target less (M = 4.22, SD
= 1.21) compared to when they did mimic (M = 4.58, SD = 1.14  resp. M = 2.98, SD =
1.40 resp. M = 4.98, SD = 0.84) and compared to the control condition (M = 4.73, SD
= 1.24 resp. M = 3.07, SD = 1.45 resp. M = 4.92, SD = 1.11). For understanding, the
same pattern was obtained, but here the differences between the imitation and no
imitation condition, F (1, 117) = 3.02, p = .08, and between the no imitation and
control condition, F (1, 114) = 3. 38, p = .07, were only marginally significant.
Information did not qualify the effects on cognitive empathy, F < 1, understanding, F
(2, 166) = 1.76, p = .18, similarity, F < 1, or liking, F < 1.
An unexpected main effect of Video on similarity feelings, F (1, 166) = 5.61,
p = .02, indicated that participants felt more similar to the target when she spoke
about a happy event (M =3.08, SD = 1.41) than when she told about a sad event (M =
2.46, SD =1.29).
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In addition, an unexpected effect of Video on understanding emerged, F (1,
166) = 4.07, p = .05; participants reported that they understood the target more in the
sad video (M = 5.01, SD =1.20) than the happy video (M = 4.79, SD = 1.34).
There were also main effects of Information on perspective taking, F (1, 166)
= 13.26, p = .00, and understanding, F (1, 166) = 44.11, p = .00. When both sound
and vision were presented, participants reported more cognitive empathy (M = 4.55,
SD =1.25) and more understanding (M = 5.27, SD =1.02) than when only vision was
presented (M = 3.91, SD = 1.25 resp. M = 4.11, SD = 1.40).
Mediations
Hypothesized mediations. How do all these consequences relate to one
another; which consequences are influenced directly by mimicry and which are
mediated by other variables? First, to examine the relatedness of affective and
cognitive empathy (Hypotheses 3a and 3b), we used the regression method proposed
by Baron and Kenny (1986). A dummy variable (Condition), contrasting the
difference between, on the one hand, no imitation, and on the other hand, imitation
and control, produced a significant effect for affective empathy, B = -. 32, t = -4.83, p
= .00, and (in a different regression model) for cognitive empathy, B = -. 32, t = -4.94,
p = .00. The latter does not fully disappear when we include affective empathy in the
regression, B = -.15, t = -2.63, p = .01, although the effect of affective empathy on
cognitive empathy is significant, B = .52, t = 8.22, p = .00; but it does reduce the
coefficient of the dummy variable from B = -.32 to B = -.15.  The Goodman I version
of the SOBEL test indicated that the indirect effect of Condition on cognitive empathy
via affective empathy is significant, z = -4.13, p = .00. 7 In conclusion, affective
empathy partially mediates the effect of Condition on cognitive empathy.
Conversely, although the effect of cognitive empathy on affective empathy is
significant, B = .54, t = 8.22, p = .00, the effect of Condition on affective empathy
does not fully disappear when we include cognitive empathy, B = -. 15, t = -2.44, p =
.02. But again, it does reduce the coefficient of the dummy variable from B = -.32 to B
= -.15.  The Goodman I version of the SOBEL test indicated that the indirect effect of
Condition on affective empathy via cognitive empathy is also significant, z = -4.21, p
= .00. In conclusion, cognitive empathy also partially mediates the effect of Condition
on affective empathy.
Next, we hypothesized that cognitive empathy mediates the effect of mimicry
on understanding (Hypothesis 4b). The effect of Condition on understanding, B= -.14,
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t = -2.08, p = .04, disappears when we include cognitive empathy, B = .00, t = .66, p =
.51,  z = -4.24, p = .00.  In this regression model, the effect of cognitive empathy on
understanding is significant, B = .57, t = 8.49, p = .00. So cognitive empathy fully
mediates the effect of Condition on understanding.
Mimicry mediation. The effects of instruction on affective and cognitive
empathy, understanding, similarity, and liking only make sense if actual mimicry
mediates these effects. As shown, the instruction to mimic or not to mimic succeeded,
but maybe there are other variables than actual mimicry that can cause these effects.
Because empathy (affective, cognitive, or both) mediates the instruction effects on
understanding, similarity, and liking, we first tested mediation of actual mimicry in
the influence of instruction on affective and cognitive empathy.
First, the dummy variable Condition produced a significant effect for cognitive
empathy, B = -. 22, t = -2.70, p = .01. This effect fully disappears when we include the
proportion of mimicked facial expressions in the regression, B = -.14, t = -1.55, p =
.12; the effect of actual mimicry on cognitive empathy is significant, B = .01, t = 2.30,
p = .02. According to the Goodman I version of the SOBEL test, the indirect effect of
Condition on cognitive empathy via actual mimicry is significant, z = -2.14, p = .00.
Thus, actual mimicry mediates the effect of Condition on cognitive empathy.
The effect of actual mimicry on affective empathy is significant as well, B =
.01, t = 2.57, p = .01, but the effect of Condition on affective empathy, B = -. 30, t = -
3.54, p = .00, does not fully disappear when we include actual mimicry, B = -. 21, t = -
2.23, p = .03. However, this does reduce the coefficient of the dummy variable from B
= -.30 to B = -.21.  The Goodman I version of the SOBEL test indicated that the
indirect effect of Condition on affective empathy via actual mimicry is significant, z =
-2.39, p = .02. So, actual mimicry partially mediates the effect of Condition on
affective empathy.
What other factor causes effects on affective empathy? Looking at the
mediation analyses concerning instruction, affective and cognitive empathy, one
possible factor is cognitive empathy, because affective and cognitive empathy mediate
each other. When cognitive empathy and actual mimicry are both included in the
regression model, the effect of Condition on affective empathy disappears, B = -. 12, t
= -1.62, p = .11, with the effect of cognitive on affective empathy being significant, B
= -. 59, t = 7.52, p = .00.
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Pathway analysis
The hypothesized relationships between all variables were tested in a LISREL
model. Our model (see Figure 1) fitted the data well: χ2 (12) = 11.18, p = .43; AGFI =
.93, NNFI = .99. The standardized coefficients in the model are all significant (p <
.05). Looking at the LISREL model, the effects of imitation can be summarized as
follows: Imitation influenced the actual amount of mimicry. Actual mimicry, in turn,
directly enhances affective and cognitive empathy. As a consequence of perspective
taking (more cognitive empathy) and emotional contagion (more affective empathy),
similarity and felt understanding are enhanced. Similarity and understanding both
enhance liking. This liking, in turn, further enhances the amount of mimicry.
Figure 2.1. Model summarizing the consequences for the perceiver of 
facial mimicry with standardized coefficients.
Note: The value between affective and cognitive empathy depicts a correlation
between the error covariances of affective (.89) and cognitive empathy (.92).
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Discussion
This chapter shows that mimicry plays an important role in empathy and
bonding related processes; the instruction to inhibit mimicry results in less contagion
of the target’s emotions, and in less cognitive empathy and understanding for the
target compared to mimicry conditions. In addition, non-mimickers felt less similarity
to and less liking for the target compared to mimickers. These instruction-effects on
empathy and bonding related processes were caused by the actual amount of mimicry.
Importantly, the control condition produced the same effects as the imitation
condition. This is not surprising, because people nonconsciously and automatically
mimic facial expressions (Dimberg, 1982), as was also shown in our study:
Participants in the control condition mimicked the target person to some extent.
Although they mimicked less than participants who were instructed to mimic, the
results for these groups were highly similar. This suggests that the effects of mimicry
are not gradual (i.e., the more mimicry, the stronger the effects); instead, a certain
level of mimicry may be sufficient to produce these positive effects, and this is the
level that occurs spontaneously. In spite of the fact that conscious imitation is more
difficult, intentionality does not interfere with its effects: the effects of imitation and
the control condition were similar.
In sum, the instruction to suppress the tendency to mimic produces reduced
affective and cognitive empathy, understanding, felt similarity, and liking. This result
emerged regardless whether the target’s facial expressions were accompanied by
verbal information indicating what the expressed emotions are about. As indicated by
the Information effects, emotional contagion does not depend on verbal information.
Consistent with previous studies, we found that emotions were caught when no verbal
information is given about the causes of the emotion. This applies even to some extent
when instructed not to imitate expressions.
Although the absence of verbal information did not reduce affective empathy
in any way, it did reduce cognitive empathy and felt understanding. It makes sense
that this difference occurred specifically on these two variables, because they both
reflect cognitive processes. Affective empathy, felt similarity, and liking are more
affectively driven, and were not influenced by verbal information.
We have no indication that other aspects of the instruction account for the
effects obtained in our study, for instance, load effects: Participants in the imitation
and no imitation condition did not report differences in their attention for the video.
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Moreover, the imitation condition was evaluated as more difficult than the no
imitation condition. This seems paradoxal; why would something that is so natural be
more difficult than something that is, apparently, not a default behavior? Perhaps
imitation is just like breathing; one breathes automatically, but when one pays
attention to it, it is more difficult. Also, in the mimicry condition it may require more
effort to monitor yourself assuring that every movement is correctly imitated, while in
the no mimicry condition one can maintain an expressionless face. Indeed, the lower
overall level of facial movements in this condition suggests that perceivers simply
decided not to move their face at all.
The results can neither be explained by assuming that participants in mimicry
conditions received more detailed information about the regions of the face involved
in mimicry. Both the mimicry and no mimicry conditions contained instructions to
pay attention to the specific features, but one group was instructed to imitate them and
one group not to. Note, in addition, that results in the control condition (where
participants did not receive any instructions and were not expected to pay attention to
specific facial features) did not differ from the mimicry condition. This implies that
information about the details of the face did not affect the results.
Another possible alternative explanation of our findings is that the results are
due to demand characteristics. However, participants in experimental conditions
reported that they thought the study was about load; i.e., the effects of an additional
task (the instruction) on attention for the video and the remembrance of details.
Additionally, demand characteristics should produce more positive results in
the imitation condition compared to the control condition, and not only reduced
effects when expressions were not mimicked. In this context, it is also interesting to
note that in a study by Stel and Van Knippenberg (2002), we obtained effects of
mimicry on emotion recognition of faces presented for 67 ms. Because of the sub-
optimal presentation in this study, participants were not able to intentionally influence
the results.
Our results on the effects of mimicry-instructions may remind you of a recent
study of Davis, Soderlund, Cole, Gadol, Kute, Myers, and Weihing (2004). They
showed that effects of instructions to take perspective were also due to conditions in
which participants were asked to inhibit perspective taking. The authors argued that
those inhibiting instructions might have led participants to psychologically distance
themselves from the target. This might also have happened in our mimicry-inhibiting
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condition. However, our instruction-effects on cognitive empathy are fully explained
by the amount of mimicry itself. This actual amount of mimicry only partially
mediated the effect of mimicry on emotional contagion, the affective form of
empathy. However, when cognitive empathy was included in this analysis, the
instruction effect on emotional contagion was also fully explained. However we do
acknowledge that psychological distancing might have occurred in the mimicry-
inhibition condition, it cannot explain our results as such.
Participants generally felt more happiness than sadness. The difference can be
explained in several ways. First, it is possible that the happy video is happier than the
sad video is sad, which could cause a stronger contagion of the happy emotion.
Second, people generally experience more positive than negative emotions. This may
also explain why participants felt more similar to the target when she spoke about a
happy event than about a sad event. In addition, taking into account their age, it is
likely that participants had more experience with meeting a partner and feeling happy
about it than with dealing with a dying parent.
The effect of Video on understanding, however, is opposed to that on
similarity feelings. Participants reported better understanding of the target when she
spoke about the sad event than about meeting her boyfriend. Feelings of similarity and
understanding are not related, then, as is also apparent in the LISREL model; there is
no path between similarity and understanding. An explanation of this Video effect on
understanding is that in the sad video condition, there is more to understand than in
the happy video condition. The situation described in the sad video is more complex
than in the happy video.
Regarding the relationships between the variables, the LISREL analysis
showed that our hypothesized relationships between variables were confirmed. Most
importantly, empathy related processes (affective and cognitive empathy and
understanding) proved to play an important role in bonding related processes
(similarity and liking). This shows that empathy is, next to bonding, another important
social function of mimicry.
In addition to this study we have been able to replicate the effects of mimicry
on empathy and bonding related processes in more simple design, using the same, as
well as a different target.
In sum, our results show that imitation of facial expressions, either controlled
or uncontrolled, results in stronger contagion of emotions. This is not just a matter of
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mood contagion; the effects obtained are specific for the emotion, because we
differentiated negative emotions into sadness and anger: Participants who saw the sad
video felt only more sadness when they imitated the target, not anger. Although the
idea that imitating facial expressions lead to emotional contagion goes back to Lipps
(1907), researchers until now have failed to demonstrate a causal relationship between
actual mimicry and emotional contagion. Using more ecologically valid materials, we
showed that mimicry indeed leads to catching the emotions of other people and we
also go beyond that. Next to this increase in affective empathy, mimicry also
enhanced cognitive empathy and understanding. Both forms of empathy influenced
similarity feelings. Finally, we showed that facially mimicking the target person
enhanced liking for this person.  Empathy, similarity and understanding played a
significant role in this process. So, in addition to Chartrand and Bargh’s findings that
being mimicked enhanced liking for mimickers, mimickers themselves also feel more
bonded with the person being mimicked. This implies that mimicry can satisfy the
need to belong for mimickees, as well as mimickers, and can provide a basis of
positive and lasting relationships. Finally, this enhanced liking has the effect of
further increasing mimicry. So, mimicry effects contribute to a positive circle in
which liking and mimicry reinforce each other.
This direct relationship obtained between liking and mimicry suggests that the
effects of feelings of relatedness on mimicry may be largely automatic. According to
Baumeister and Leary (1995), people are instinctively driven toward developing and
maintaining belongingness. If this need to belong indeed has an evolutionary basis, it
makes sense that processes that enhance the sense of belonging, such as mimicry, are
automatic. It is conceivable, thus, that there is an automatic imitation-relatedness link.
This link may exist not only for the mimicker but also for the person being mimicked
(Van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami and Van Knippenberg, in press). These effects, in
turn, may enhance the smoothness of the interaction. More recent studies, in which we
investigated the dynamic effects of mimicry in real interactions, also show (in
addition to replicating the effects described in the present paper) that mimicry affects
the target person as well (Stel & Vonk, 2005a).
Thus, imitation has positive consequences for people as social beings; it plays
an important role in emotional processes, in understanding each other and in social
bonding. Our results thereby illuminate the adaptive role of facial mimicry in
understanding others and feeling related to others.   
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Endnotes
1 There are other functions of mimicry, i.e. learning and survival. But we
restrict ourselves to the functions of mimicry in social interactions.
2 We recorded everyone in the sound condition to check whether the
instructions were carried out. Additionally, participants in the control condition of the
no sound conditions were also recorded in order to compare the amount of mimicry of
the sound and no sound control conditions.
3 We included angry emotions, because we wanted to demonstrate that specific
emotions are caught, and not just mood (positive vs. negative).
4 Expressing the mimicry variable as the proportion of mimicry out of all the
target’s facial movements with taking into account this movement tendency yielded
the same effects.
5 Conceptually, irritated and angry belong together, but because of their low
alpha (.32) we excluded irritated; because angry is a more core emotion and irritation
might also measure annoyance due to the target person or the film.
6  To illustrate that perceived target affect does not mediate these effects, a 3
(Imitation; yes vs. no vs. control) x 2 (Video; happy vs. sad) x 3 (Emotion: happiness
vs. sadness vs. anger) x 2 (Information: sound + vision vs. vision only) MANOVA
was conducted with perceived targets’ emotion as a within-subjects factor. As with
the perceivers’ emotion, there was a Video x Emotion interaction, F (2, 164) =
440.77, p = .00; participants perceived the target as more happy (M = 5.99, SD = 0.74)
and less sad (M = 2.16, SD = 0.85) and angry (M = 1.41, SD = 0.69) when they saw
the video with the happy event than the video with the sad event; in the sad video
condition, participants perceived the target more sad (M = 5.80, SD = 0.84) than
happy (M = 2.56, SD = 1.02) and angry (M = 3.43, SD = 1.59). This effect was not
qualified by Imitation, F (4, 328) = 1.89, p = .11. This means that perceived target
affect does not play a role in the Imitation effects of the targets’ emotions. The effect
of Video x Emotion x Imitation x Information was nonsignificant as well, F (4, 328) =
1.47, p = .21. The Video x Emotion effect was qualified by Information, F (2, 164) =
6.41, p = .00. Simple effects showed that the Video x Emotion effect was present
when emotions where both verbally and nonverbally expressed, F (2, 113) = 430.44, p
= .00, and also when only nonverbal emotions were expressed, F (2, 50) = 123.37, p =
.00. However, in the happy video condition, the participants rated the woman as
happier (M = 6.14, SD = 0.60) and less sad (M = 2.01, SD = 0.73) in the sound +
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vision condition than in vision only conditions (M = 5.68, SD = 0.90 resp. M = 2.47,
SD = 1.00), F (1, 86) = 7.85, p = .01 resp F (1,86) = 5.90, p = .02. There was no
difference for anger, F (1, 86) = 1.87, p = .18. There were no significant differences of
emotional ratings for the Information conditions in the sad video condition, F (1, 87)
= 2.42, p = .12 resp F (1,87) = 3.36, p = .07 resp F (1, 87) = 3.00, p = .09 (The
marginal differences are of the same pattern as for the happy video).
7 Using the SOBEL test and the Goodman II version resulted in the same p-
values and approximately the same z-values for all Goodman I tests.

Chapter 3
Empathic processes between mimickers and mimickees
Mimicry is said to enhance prosocial feelings. We argue that the evidence for
this assumption is incomplete. Studies on prosocial consequences for the mimicker
have been either correlational or have relied on video materials, thereby lacking real
interaction data, which is an essential component in the assumption. Regarding
consequences for the mimickee, researchers have mainly focused on benefits of
mimicry for liking, smoothness of the interaction, and prosocial behaviors, lacking
evidence whether mimicry causes the target to feel empathized with and understood.
In the present article, we therefore more thoroughly investigate prosocial benefits for
the mimicker and mimickee in social interactions.
Mimicry has many benefits in social interactions. For instance, students feel
more involvement in the classroom when mirroring the teacher’s postures (LaFrance
& Broadbent, 1976). Mimickers as well as mimickees become more prosocial in
general, that is, they show more prosocial behavior towards their interaction partner,
as well as other people, and they give more to charity  (Van Baaren, Holland,
Kawakami, & Van Knippenberg, 2004; Stel, Van Baaren & Vonk, 2005). Another
benefit of mimicry is that it satisfies the need to belong, by creating bonds between
people; mimicry and ‘rapport’ are related (i.e. Bernieri, 1988; LaFrance, 1979).
Liking is also enhanced by mimicry; When being mimicked, liking for the mimicker
is enhanced (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) and mimickers themselves report more liking
for mimicked person (Stel & Vonk, 2004). In addition, mimicry enhances
interpersonal closeness between people (Van Baaren & Chartrand, 2005).
Mimicry also has benefits for communication in emotional situations, for it
can help interpreting the expressions of one’s interaction partners and understanding
their feelings and thoughts. Via mimicry, one adopts the same facial expression as the
interaction partner. The activated facial muscles, in turn, send signals to the brain so
that the corresponding emotions are felt. This feedback mechanism from muscles to
the brain was already proposed by Darwin (1872/1965), and was further elaborated by
Izard (1977) and Tomkins (1982) (see Hess, Kappas, McHugo, Lanzetta & Kleck,
                                                 
 This chapter is based on Stel & Vonk (2005a)
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1992, for empirical evidence). Thus, mimicry in combination with this facial feedback
mechanism helps to feel what others are experiencing. This is an affective form of
empathy, also referred to as emotional contagion (Hatfield, Cacioppo & Rapson,
1992). The direct link between mimicry and this emotional contagion was first
demonstrated by Stel and Vonk (2004). In this study, we also showed that the
cognitive form of empathy, perspective taking, is affected by mimicry as well, which
in turn enhances understanding of others.
In sum, it appears that mimicry serves the need to belong, facilitates
communication by enhancing understanding between people, and creates empathic
feelings and behaviors among mimickers (also referred to as perceivers) and
mimickees (also referred to as targets). However, the extant evidence for these
conclusions is incomplete.
Studies on the prosocial feelings of the mimicker have been either
correlational (Bernieri, 1988; LaFrance, 1979; LaFrance & Broadbent, 1976) or, in
experimental studies, based on videotapes (Stel & Vonk, 2004), or both (Chrisholm &
Strayer 1995). This means that, at present, we do not know (a) whether the assumed
beneficial effects of mimicry occur in simple every-day interactions between people,
and (b) how the effects on perceivers and targets emerge in real interactions, where
the thoughts, feelings and behaviors of both are continuously and dynamically
affected by each other.
In our first study of this chapter, we examine interactions between 2
participants, which allows us to test whether mimickee and mimicker actually
experience the same emotions, i.e., whether perceivers catch the emotions of their
interaction partner more strongly due to mimicry. This would also provide evidence
that mimicry enhances emotional contagion of real emotions, i.e., emotions that are
not acted by an actor on a video film. Regarding the cognitive form of empathy and
understanding, we expect to replicate effects found in video studies, i.e., enhanced
perspective-taking due to mimicry, which in turn is predicted to enhance
understanding for the target.
If mimicry enhances empathy and understanding on the side of the mimicker,
it is conceivable that this is also communicated this to the target via mimicry. Rogers
(1957) already assumed that mimicry communicates understanding, and
recommended mimicking nonverbal behaviors of clients in clinical settings. To this
date, it has been demonstrated that congruency in postures and body movements
Empathic processes between mimickers and mimickees 41
characterizes rapport between therapist and client (Scheflen, 1964), and is positively
related to perceptions of affiliation and verbal disclosure (Cappella, 1981). In
addition, people who imitate others are also evaluated more positively (Bates, 1975;
Manusov, 1993; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). However, it remains uninvestigated
whether mimicry truly communicates empathy and understanding. Some indirect
evidence that mimicry serves communication purposes has been provided by Bavelas,
Black, Lemery, & Mullett (1986). They showed that people wince more when they
have eye contact with victims in pain. In addition, participants with increased wincing
behaviors were rated as more caring by naive observers. Bavelas et al. concluded that
eye contact enhances mimicry and, hence, that mimicry should serve communication
purposes. However, the exact causal chain is not entirely clear here. For instance,
when having eye contact with other people, one can also come to feel more personally
involved, enhancing wincing behavior. In addition, wincing is not actual mimicry of
the behavior of the victim, but an automatic empathic response due to seeing someone
in pain, which occurs regardless whether the victim winces or not. In our first study,
we investigate whether actual mimicry can communicate empathy and understanding
to the mimicked person.
The study of real interactions gives us the opportunity to examine two other
assumed benefits of mimicry, interpersonal closeness and smoothness of the
interaction. Van Baaren and Chartrand (2005) showed that being mimicked makes
mimickees feel closer to others in general. In Study 3.1, we examine whether this
effect occurs within the relation between the target and perceiver, i.e., whether the
mimickee feels closer towards the mimicker, and whether these effects are mirrored in
the perceiver’s sense of closeness towards the target.
Regarding smoothness of the interaction, Chartrand and Bargh (1999) showed
that targets who were mimicked by a confederate, perceived the interactions as
smoother than nonmimicked participants. Our study allows us to test whether these
effects can be replicated in real interactions, and whether the perceiver feels the same.
This question is important because perceivers are instructed to consciously mimic the
target, so they are aware of what they are doing and actually must take extra effort to
do it. In spite of this deliberate effort, we assume that the interaction is actually
smoothened by mimicry so that mimickers rate the interaction as smoother just as
targets do.
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To summarize, in our first study we investigate the prosocial feelings due to
mimicry on the side of the mimicker in social interactions and whether mimicry also
signals empathy and understanding towards the mimickee. In addition, we test
whether both target and perceiver feel closer to one another and rate the interaction as
smoother due to mimicry.
Study 3.1
Method
Procedure
Participants were told that they were going to interact with another participant
and talk about a video fragment one of them had to watch beforehand. The cover story
informed participants that we were interested in communication skills. After being
introduced to each other, it was randomly decided who would be watching the video
of about 5 minutes. In the mean time, the other person, the perceiver, received the
Imitation instructions, whereas targets thought their interaction partner was working
on another short task. Subsequently, both participants were brought to another room
and targets were asked to tell perceivers what they had seen on the video and how that
made them feel, while perceivers could ask questions. After a 4-minute interaction,
they each went to a different room and filled out a questionnaire.
Participants were recorded during the interaction, to check whether the
imitation instructions were carried out. Afterwards they were debriefed and were
asked for permission to use the recordings.
Participants and design
Participants were 164 (46 male and 118 female) students at the Radboud
University Nijmegen. Their age ranged from 17.50 to 37.50 years, with an average of
21.00. They participated for payment (€2,-) and were randomly assigned to the
conditions of a 2 (Role: target vs. perceiver) x 2 (Imitation; yes vs. no)1 x 2 (Video;
positive vs. negative) between-subjects factorial design. Males and females were
counterbalanced across conditions.
Materials
Videos. All participants saw a film of five minutes inducing positive vs.
negative emotions. The positive video was a fragment from Walt Disney’s Jungle
Book, in which a little boy is dancing and a catchy song with a bear. The negative
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video showed a fragment of Sophie’s Choice in which a mother is forced to choose
which one of her two children is sent away with a nazi soldier.
Imitation instructions. Half of the perceivers received an instruction to imitate
the facial expressions the target would display, while the other half received an
instruction to suppress the natural tendency to mimic. Participants were told to remind
themselves of the instructions throughout the interaction and that they should not feel
awkward about imitating or not imitating targets facial expressions, because, they
were told, people never notice this. In a previous study (Stel & Vonk, 2004) these
instructions were very effective and carried out well.
The questionnaires. The questionnaire for perceivers contained 11 emotion
items, on which they indicated how happy, sad, or angry they felt during the
interaction. The emotions were: tense, enthusiastic, pleased, worried, irritated, angry,
confused, cheerful, dreary, happy, and sad. In addition, three questions measured
cognitive empathy (Did you take the perspective of your interaction partner? Were
you involved with the story that your interaction partner told? Did you place yourself
in the shoes of your interaction partner?), and one understanding (Did you understand
your interaction partner?). At the end of the questionnaire, perceivers in the imitation
and no imitation conditions were asked how difficult they thought the instruction was.
The questionnaire for targets contained the same 11 emotion items on which
they indicated how they felt during the video. In addition, targets answered the same
questions for emotions felt during the interaction with the perceiver, because other
variables than the video and talking about the video could influence targets feelings
during this interaction.
Questionnaires for both the target and perceiver contained an adjusted version
of Aron, Aron and Smollan’s Inclusion of Other in Self (IOS) Scale closeness (1992).
This scale presented 6 pictures, each containing two circles where one of the circles
represented the participant, and the other their interaction partner. The 6 pictures
varied in the distance and degree of overlap between the two circles2. Participants
were asked to choose the picture that best represented how close they felt towards
their interaction partner. In addition, we asked both targets and perceivers to indicate
how smooth they thought their interaction had been. In both questionnaires some
distracting questions were added about the specific contents the target had talked
about, leading both to believe the study was about communication and information
transfer. For all questions, 7-point Likert scales were used. Finally, background
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variables were assessed and all participants were asked in an open-ended question if
they knew what the experiment was about.
Results and Discussion
Because Sex of participant did not produce any significant effects, it was
discarded from the analyses below. None of the targets mentioned spontaneously that
they were intentionally being mimicked or not mimicked in the open-ended question,
nor did they recognize this when it was suggested directly during debriefing. For
perceivers, there was no difference between the imitation and no imitation condition
in rated difficulty of the instruction, F (1, 78) = 1.10, p = .30.
In the analyses, the unit of observation is a couple. One couple is not included
in the facial expressions data because of camera problems.
Manipulation check
To check whether participants carried out the instructions, we coded the facial
expressions of all participants and compared these with the facial expressions of the
target person. First, the targets were coded, using event sampling, i.e., a facial
movement was coded whenever it was observed. Next, we further developed the
coding system for the expressions of the participants, so that it included all relevant
expressions and movements that the targets had shown. These relevant expressions
did not differ from the expressions observed in our previous study (Stel & Vonk,
2004). Therefore, the same coding system was used, consisting of 6 broad categories,
namely: blinking, changes in direction of gaze, movements of eyebrows, mouth, nose,
and head movements. These categories encompass more specific subcategories, for
example, in the mouth category: laughing with mouth closed, with mouth open,
yawning, licking lips, biting lips, stiffening lips. Coders rated when each of these
behaviors was observed.
4 Independent raters coded the facial expressions of the targets and perceivers.
They each rated different parts of the material: Our previous study (Stel & Vonk,
2004) showed that interobserver reliability of these ratings is very high, between .97
and .98. Subsequently, the behaviors of the perceivers were matched with the
behaviors of the targets, using time blocks of 10 seconds. When the behavior of the
participant matched the behavior of the target person and occurred after the target’s
behavior within a time block, it was scored as an instance of mimicry.
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A 2 (Imitation) x 2 (Video) analysis of variance (ANOVA) with amount of
mimicry as a dependent variable, confirmed that the Imitation instructions effected
actual amount of mimicry, F (2, 76) = 10.50, p = .00; Participants who were instructed
to intentionally mimic the target’s facial expressions, imitated the target more (25.00
% out of all their behaviors) than participants who were instructed to suppress
mimicry (17.64 %).3
Affective empathy
To establish whether mimicry enhances affective empathy (emotional
contagion), we analyzed whether targets and perceiver actually felt the same emotions
during the interaction due to mimicry. The items of the emotion scale can be classified
into three core emotions: happiness, sadness, and anger. For each emotion, we took
the set with the highest Cronbach's alpha based on targets and perceivers scores. The
final set for happiness consists of: enthusiastic, pleased, cheerful, and happy  (α =
.80); for sadness: worried, dreary, and sad (α = .79) for anger only the item angry was
used. 4
In the imitation condition, targets’ and perceivers’ feelings of happiness were
more strongly correlated, r = .53, p < .01, than in the no imitation condition, r = .30, p
= .06, z = 1.75, p = .04. In addition, sad emotions were marginally more strongly
matched in the imitation, r = .61 p < .01, than the no imitation condition, r = .44, p <
.01, z = 1.48, p = .07. Finally, feelings of anger were more strongly correlated
between targets and perceivers in the imitation, r = .47, p < .01 than in the no
imitation condition, r = .25, p = .11, z = 1.65, p = .05.
So in general, targets and perceivers were more emotionally attuned to one
another in the imitation than in the no mimicry condition.
Mimicry mediation. We used the regression method proposed by Baron and
Kenny (1986) to demonstrate that these emotional contagion effects were due to
mimicry. First, the dummy variable Imitation produced a significant effect for
affective empathy5, B = -. 74, t = -2.06, p = .04. This effect fully disappeared when we
included the actual amount of mimicked facial expressions in the regression, B = -.43,
t = -1.18, p = .24.  In addition, the effect of actual mimicry on affective empathy was
also significant, B = .10, t = 2.59, p = .01. According to the Goodman II version of the
SOBEL test, the indirect effect of Condition on cognitive empathy via mimicry is
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significant, z = -2.03, p = .02. Thus, actual mimicry mediates the effect of Imitation
on emotional contagion.
Perceiver’s cognitive empathy and understanding
Cronbach's alpha for the three questions about perceiver’s cognitive empathy
was .83. A 2 (Imitation) x 2 (Video) ANOVA showed main effects on cognitive
empathy, F (1,78) = 12.73; p = .00, and on understanding, F (1,78) = 8.66, p = .00;
indicating that mimickers could more easily take perspective (M = 5.03, SD = 0.75)
and understood the target better (M = 5.80, SD = 0.61) than non-mimickers (resp. M =
4.17, SD = 1.33 vs. M = 5.24, SD = 1.03). There were no effects of Video, nor
interaction effects.
 In our previous chapter we showed that cognitive empathy mediated the effect
of mimicry on understanding. To replicate this, we again used Baron and Kenny’s
(1986) regression method. The dummy variable Imitation produced a significant
effect for understanding, B = -. 56, t = -2.99, p = .00. This effect fully disappears
when we include cognitive empathy in the regression, B = -.35, t = -1.79, p = .08. The
final condition was also satisfied; the effect of cognitive empathy on understanding
was also significant, B = .25, t = 3.03, p = .00. According to the Goodman II version
of the SOBEL test, the indirect effect of Condition on cognitive empathy via actual
mimicry is significant, z = -2.36, p = .02. Thus, cognitive empathy mediates the effect
of Imitation on understanding.6
Target’s feelings of being empathized with and understood
Cronbach's alpha for the three questions about target’s feelings of being
empathized with was .77. A 2 (Imitation) x 2 (Video) ANOVA did not show the
hypothesized main effect on empathy, F (1,78) = 2.25; p = .14, nor on understanding,
F (1,78) = .97, p = .33. Although nonsignificant, the means are in expected direction
(felt empathy: Mimitation = 4.93, SD = 0.94  vs. MNo imitation = 4.60, SD = 0.97; felt
understanding Mimitation  = 5.43, SD = 1.17 vs. MNo imitation = 5.19, SD = 0.99). There
were no effects of Video, nor interaction effects.
Closeness and smoothness of the interaction
A 2 (Role) x 2 (Imitation) x 2 (Video) MANOVA showed a main effect of
Imitation on closeness, F (1,78) = 14.02; p = .00; mimickers (M = 2.85, SD = 1.03) as
well as mimickees (M = 2.70, SD = 0.94) felt closer to one another than in the no
mimicry condition (resp. M = 2.40, SD = 0.96 vs. M = 2.10, SD = 0.85).
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A 2 (Role) x 2 (Imitation) x 2 (Video) MANOVA on rated smoothness of the
interaction showed a main effect of Imitation, F (1,78) = 2.12; p = .05; perceivers (M
= 4.28, SD = 1.22) as well as targets (M = 4.78, SD = 1.40) rated the interaction as
smoother in the mimicry that in the no mimicry condition (resp. M = 3.88, SD = 1.52
vs. M = 4.14, SD = 1.28). In addition, a main effect of Role, F (1,78) = 4.58; p = .04,
indicated that targets in general rated the interaction as smoother (M = 4.45, SD =
1.37) than perceivers (M = 4.07, SD = 1.39).
To summarize, perceivers and targets were more emotionally attuned to one
another in the imitation than in the no imitation condition. In addition, perceivers
could more easily take perspective of the target due to imitation, which in turn
influenced understanding for the target. Both targets and perceivers felt more close to
one another and rated the interaction as smoother in the imitation than in the no
imitation condition. However, although the means were in the expected direction,
targets did not feel more empathized with or understood better due to mimicry.
Study 3.2
The results of Study 3.1 showed that the beneficial effects of mimicry on
empathy and understanding occur in an every-day interaction between people, thereby
replicating the effects of more contrived studies using video material with an actor
exhibiting highly emotional behaviors. However, our expectancy that mimicry signals
empathy and understanding to the target was not confirmed. A disadvantage of the
study of real interactions is that they are fraught with error variance. Both targets and
perceivers respond to specific individual characteristics and behaviors of the other
person. These responses, in turn, influence subsequent behaviors. One of the
individual differences involved concerns the perceiver's personality with respect to
empathy, friendliness, extraversion – all of which can dramatically affect target's
ratings of how understood and empathized with they felt. This could severely reduce
the power the test of mimicry effects on these variables.
In our second study of this chapter, therefore, we used a confederate who was
trained to behave in a standardized way, and we varied the amount of mimicry
(imitation or no imitation of the target). So, no other variables other than mimicry can
affect targets’ sense of being empathized with and understood.
In addition, we used a different interaction situation than in Study 3.1. In a
situation such as the one in Study 3.1, it would be difficult for the confederate to act in
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a standardized way without being perceived as cold, because this situation calls for
personal, not standardized reactions towards what the target is expressing. Therefore,
we created a less personal and emotional situation, while still involving empathy and
understanding; targets had to ‘solve’ moral problems; i.e., they had to choose between
two bad choices of moral dilemmas and give a motivation for their choices. In this
situation, the confederate can act in a standardized way without being perceived as
cold and impersonal, and mimicry can still be perceived by the target as a sign of
empathy and understanding.
This time we expected to obtain significant effects of mimicry on feeling
understood and empathized with. In addition, we expected to replicate the effects
found in Study 3.1 for the target on closeness and smoothness of the interaction.
Method
Participants and design
Participants were 60 (9 male and 51 female) students at the Radboud
University Nijmegen. Their age ranged from 18 to 27 years, with an average of 21.23.
They participated for payment (€ 2,-) and were randomly assigned to the conditions of
a 2 (Imitation; yes vs. no) factorial design. 7
Procedure
Participants were told that in the experiment they were going to interact with
another person to measure conversation abilities. Before the interaction started, they
read two dilemmas (see Materials), which were going to be the topics during
interaction.
Then, the experimenter brought the participant to the room where the
interaction partner was already waiting. Participants were told that the interaction
would have the form of an interview in which one of them asked questions about the
dilemmas, and the other was the responder. They were told that it had been randomly
specified who would fulfill which role. In reality, the interaction partner of the
participant was a confederate, and the participant was always assigned to the role of
responder. The confederate was trained to interact in a standardized way and was
naive about the real purpose of the study. In addition, the confederate was instructed
to naturally imitate the participant's expressions, postures and behaviors, or not to
imitate. The experimenter told the participant and confederate that she would indicate
when the interaction time of 5 minutes was over.
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After the interaction, the participant and confederate were asked to fill out a
questionnaire (see Materials) in another room. Afterwards all participants were
debriefed about the real purpose of the study.
Materials
Dilemmas. The dilemmas described two situations, in which the participant
had to choose between two options (Spitzer, 2002). In addition, after responding to
each dilemma, the confederate read variations on those dilemmas. The first dilemma
described a situation in which a train could not be controlled anymore and would kill
5 people within a few seconds. The only possibility was to switch the route the train
was on, which would only kill one person. Variations on this dilemma were, for
instance, what the participant would do if the one person was his/her friend, and the
other five were unacquainted, and what the participant would do when the confederate
himself was this one person.
The second dilemma described a situation in which the participant was
responsible for assigning donated organs to patients, and was able to save 5 lives by
killing a healthy patient. Participants were asked whether they would save the lives of
these 5 people or not. Additional variants described for instance that all 5 patients
were friends and the healthy patient was not.
Dependent measures. The questions about empathy and understanding of
Study 3.1 were reframed; participants were asked whether they felt their interaction
partner took perspective of what they were feeling; was involved in what they were
saying; had placed himself in their shoes; and whether they felt understood. In
addition, the questionnaire also contained the same questions on closeness and
smoothness of the interaction as in Study 3.1. To ensure results cannot be explained
by mood effects, the final questionnaire further contained the same emotion items as
in Study 3.1, this time targets had to report which emotions they had felt during the
interaction. Finally, background variables were assessed and participants were asked
what they thought the goal of the experiment was.
Results and Discussion
Felt empathy and understanding
Cronbach's alpha for the three questions about cognitive empathy was .76. A 2
(Imitation) ANOVA was conducted on felt empathy and understanding. Imitation
affected cognitive empathy, F (1, 58) = 5.30, p = .02, and understanding, F (1, 58) =
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5.33, p = .02: When targets were mimicked they felt, more than in the no mimicry
condition, that the interaction partner empathized with them (M = 4.64, SD = 0.78 vs.
M = 4.13, SD = 0.91) and understood them (M = 5.33, SD = 0.62 vs. M = 4.82, SD =
1.01).
We used Baron and Kenny’s (1986) regression method to check whether
feelings of being empathized with mediate the effect of mimicry on feelings of
understanding, as was the case in Study 3.1 for the perceiver. The dummy variable
Imitation produced a significant effect for feeling understood, B = -. 52, t = -2.31, p =
.03. This effect fully disappears when we include feeling empathized with in the
regression, B = -.33, t = -1.51, p = .14. Finally, the effect of feeling empathized with
on feeling understanding was also significant, B = .36, t = 2.91, p = .00. According to
the Goodman II version of the SOBEL test, the indirect effect of Condition on
cognitive empathy via actual mimicry is marginally significant, z = -1.88, p = .06.
In sum mimicry signals empathy towards the mimickee, and this in turn makes
the mimickee feel understood.
Closeness and Smoothness
A 2 (Imitation) ANOVA was conducted on closeness, and smoothness of the
interaction. Main effects of Imitation for closeness, F (1, 58) = 5.28, p = .02, and
smoothness, F (1, 58) = 6.98, p = .01, indicated that when participants were imitated,
they felt closer to the interaction partner (M = 2.96, SD = 1.16) and rated the
interaction as smoother (M = 4.96, SD = 1.09) compared to participants who were not
imitated (resp. M = 2.36, SD = 0.86 vs. M = 4.15, SD = 1.25). 8
General Discussion
Our studies unambiguously demonstrate that mimicry has benefits in social
interactions. Focusing on the prosocial feelings empathy and understanding, we
showed mimicry produced higher correlations between perceiver’s and target’s
emotions. Mimicking perceivers also more easily took perspective of the target, which
enhanced understanding. In our second study, we demonstrated that mimicry itself
communicates empathy and understanding, even when no other signs of empathy
were transmitted; when being mimicked, targets felt more empathized with and, as a
result, better understood. In addition, we showed that mimicry leads both target and
perceiver to feel more close to one another and experience the interaction as
smoother. These effects of mimicry have not yet had any systematic research
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attention. On the whole, then, it seems that mimicry leads target and perceivers to
become more attuned to one another and more in sync.
Because mimicry is a natural tendency, one might argue that it is more
difficult to suppress the tendency to mimic than to intentionally imitate someone's
expressions. This would mean that the effects for perceivers in Study 3.1 can be
accounted for by cognitive load in the no-mimicry condition. However, perceivers in
the imitation and no imitation condition did not report any differences in the difficulty
of carrying out the instruction. Note that intentionally performing an automatic and
unconscious response also requires effort, because perceivers constantly had to
monitor themselves, making sure that every movement was correctly imitated.
Furthermore, perceivers were instructed to pay attention to specific features of
the target’s face, while one group was instructed to imitate them and one group to
suppress the tendency to mimic. So the results obtained for perceivers cannot be
explained by assuming that perceivers in the imitation condition received more
detailed information about the target’s face. Note also that in a previous study (Stel &
Vonk, 2004), we showed that results in the control condition (where participants did
not receive any instructions) did not differ from the imitation condition. This suggests
that information about facial details did not affect the results.
Another competing explanation, that the effects in Study 3.1 were due to
demand characteristics (i.e., that participants were aware of the hypothesized effects
of mimicry), can also be ruled out. First, targets did not even notice being imitated or
not, so they could not have been influenced by demand characteristics. Most
perceivers thought the study was about what kind of information and how accurately
the information was transferred. In addition, this explanation has also been ruled out
by the fact that the control condition in our previous study (Stel & Vonk, 2004)
produced similar results as the mimicry condition; if demand characteristics
influenced the results, the mimicry condition should have produced more pronounced
effects than the control condition.
In Study 3.1, target’s and perceiver’s emotions on happiness and anger were
more strongly correlated with each other in the imitation than in the no imitation
condition. For feelings of sadness, the pattern was the same but the difference
between conditions failed to reach significance. In the no imitation condition, targets'
and perceivers' feelings of sadness were still correlated to some extent. It is possible
that some emotions are more easily caught than others (i.e., are more contagious, even
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in the absence of mimicry). Sadness may be one of them, because in social interaction
it is almost always functional to respond in tune with a sad person (whereas anger, on
the other hand, may often require calming the person down rather than catching the
anger oneself). At present, however, this explanation is speculative. In future research,
it will be interesting to examine if some emotions are inherently more contagious than
others.
Although we already demonstrated emotional contagion effects in our
previous study, we can now show that mimicry causes a stronger match between
emotions of 2 people. Additionally, we showed that emotional contagion effects occur
in an every-day real interaction and with real emotions that are less obviously facially
expressed than those of an actor on a video.
Mimicry not only enhances empathic feelings and understanding for the
perceiver, as shown in Study 3.1, but also communicates this to the mimicked
persons. We showed this in Study 3.2, after controlling for individual variations in the
mimicker's behaviors. Targets who were mimicked felt more empathized with and
understood.
The results of Study 3.2 cannot be explained by mood effects, i.e., that being
mimicked makes the target feel more positive in general, which could reflect on our
dependent variables; there was no difference in felt emotions in the imitation and no
imitation condition. So, mere mimicry communicates empathy and understanding
towards mimickees, and communicates that in a way that cannot be misinterpreted:
The effects were found regardless whether the mimicker was seen as likeable or not.
In addition to prosocial feelings and communication of those feelings, another
benefit of mimicry concerns the smoothness of the interaction. We replicated
Chartrand and Bargh’s (1999) finding in a real interaction situation; mimicked targets
perceived the interactions as smoother than nonmimicked targets. In addition,
perceivers felt the same. So mimicry smoothened the interaction so that mimickers
rate the interaction as smoother just as targets do, despite their deliberate effort to
carry out their instructions.
Finally, we demonstrated that both perceivers and targets report more
closeness towards their interaction partner due to mimicry, thereby supporting the
assumption that mimicry enhances interpersonal closeness within their relationship.
We also replicated this finding in Study 3.2 for the target, thereby demonstrating that
this closeness effect is caused by mimicry alone, and not by other perceiver
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characteristics that may vary along with mimicry. The results of both studies suggest
that mimicry not only brings people closer together, or makes them feel closer to other
in general, as was shown by Van Baaren and Chartrand (2005), but actually creates a
special bond between perceiver and target by making them feel closer to one another.
To conclude, we provided further evidence for the assumption that mimicry
has benefits for us in social interactions. As we have shown, mimicry and the
prosocial feelings empathy and understanding have a profound relationship; mimicry
causes 2 people to become more strongly emotionally attuned to one another, and
causes the perceiver to become more empathic and understanding. In addition,
mimicry itself communicates this to others and causes the mimicker to feel
empathized with and understood. This bi-directional influence of mimicry brings
people closer together and creates a special bond.
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Endnotes
1 We did not include a no-instruction control group, because a previous study
(Stel & Vonk, 2004) showed that the effects in the control condition, in which people
automatically mimic, parallel the effects in the imitation condition.
2 The difference with the version of Aron et al’s IOS Scale, is that the pictorial
measure indicating the least inclusion of the other in self were consisted of two circles
contacting each other, but not overlapping; in the picture reflecting highest inclusion,
the two circles almost overlapped, as in the IOS Scale.
3 To ensure perceivers did not compensate inhibiting mimicry behavior by
nodding, a 2 (Imitation) x 2 (Video) ANOVA was conducted with amount of nods as
a dependent variable. There was no difference in nodding behavior between the
Imitation conditions, F (1, 76) = 1.39, p = .24.
4 Conceptually, irritated and angry belong together, but because of their low
alpha for perceivers (.47) we excluded irritated; because angry is a more core emotion
and irritation might also measure annoyance due to other factors.
5 Affective empathy consists of perceiver’s emotions during the interaction
that were caught due to the instruction to mimic.
6 Using the SOBEL test and the Goodman I version resulted in the same p-
values and approximately the same z-values for all Goodman II tests.
7 In the present study, we additionally manipulated Liking for the confederate,
because this study was combined with a study conducted on the moderating role of a
priori liking on the mimicry-liking link (see Stel, Van Baaren, Blascovich, McCall &
Vonk, 2005). Liking did not produce any significant effects and was discarded from
the present analyses.
8 To make sure effects cannot be explained by a more positive mood in the
mimicry compared to the no mimicry condition a 2 (Imitation; yes vs. no) x 2 (Mood:
positive vs. negative) MANOVA was conducted with targets’ emotion during the
interaction as a within-subjects factor. For each mood, we took the set with the
highest Cronbach's alpha. The final set for positive consist of enthusiastic, pleased,
cheerful, and happy (α = .82); for negative: tense, worried, angry, confused, dreary,
and sad (α = .82). A main effect of Mood, F (1, 58) = 127.75, p = .00, indicated that
targets in all conditions felt more negative (M = 5.28, SD = 1.12) than positive (M =
3.62, SD = 1.06). This can be explained because participants had to choose between
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two bad options throughout the interaction. This mood effect was not qualified by
Imitation, F < 1, meaning that there is no differential influence of the imitation
instructions on mood.

PART II
Qualifiers on the consequences of mimicry

Chapter 4
When mimicry does not have (in)direct social benefits 
To understand someone, is to feel into someone’s emotions and take
perspective of the person. This way you empathize and also communicate
understanding to the person, who in turn may feel understood. Mimicry facilitates this
process.
The facilitation of imitation on affective empathy has been hypothesized since
1907 (Lipps). It makes intuitive sense and it can also be deducted from known
mechanisms such as facial feedback (Hatfield, Cacioppo & Rapson, 1992). Namely,
when people perceive facial expressions, these facial expressions are automatically
mimicked (Dimberg, 1982). These mimicked activated facial muscles, in turn, gives
feedback to the brains, so that corresponding emotions are felt (Tomkins, 1982; Hess,
Kappas, McHugo, Lanzetta & Kleck, 1992). There is lots of evidence that people are
highly susceptible to catching other people’s emotions (e.g. Kerckhoff & Back, 1968;
Schachter & Singer, 1962; Simner, 1971).
Nevertheless, previous researchers did not succeed in demonstrating a causal
relationship between mimicry and emotional contagion so far (Gump & Kulik, 1997;
Blairy, Herrera, & Hess, 1999; Hess & Blairy, 2001). We have argued (Stel & Vonk,
2004) that if one wants to investigate emotional contagion as a function of mimicry,
one has to investigate it in ecologically valid settings, i.e., in settings where mimicry
has a social function. This also goes for perspective taking, the cognitive form of
empathy. The social functions approach to mimicry proposes that mimicry fosters
empathy and understanding, and creates bonds between people (Van Baaren, Maddux,
Chartrand, De Bouter, & Van Knippenberg, 2003; Van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami,
& Van Knippenberg, 2004; Cheng & Chartrand, 2003; Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, &
Chartrand, 2003, Stel & Vonk, 2004). Using richer experimental materials (e.g.,
longer video films, live interactions) that were sufficient to produce empathy towards
the mimicked person, in the way they do in real life, we did demonstrate a causal
effect of mimicry on empathy.
In previous studies, we used materials that were presented to participants as
                                                 
 This chapter is based on Stel & Vonk (2005b)
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real, i.e., participants assumed that the emotions they saw were actually experienced
by the target person. If it is the case, as we have argued, that the effects of mimicry
emerge primarily in settings where mimicry can potentially serve its social functions,
this means that the effects might be reduced when people perceive emotional
expressions knowing that emotions are not really experienced by the target. After all,
in these cases there is no point in empathizing with the person, because the social
functions of empathy are reduced. In the present studies, we want to test the
hypothesis that, when perceivers assume that emotions are acted, i.e., when the
expressions to be imitated are not seen as real, imitating these expressions does not
enhance empathy compared to not imitating these expressions, whereas imitating
expressions perceived as real does.
We tested this hypothesis in two studies. First, we presented participants with
a scene from a reality soap about which, at the time the study was running, there was
some debate regarding whether the actors were 'themselves' or whether they were
acting. We predicted that the effects of imitation are stronger among participants who
believe the soap is real than participants who do not believe in the authenticity of the
events. In the second study, we manipulated perceived realness of emotions directly.
Study 4.1
Method
Participants and design
 42 Female high school students participated voluntarily. Their age ranged
from 16 to 25 years, with an average of 18.0. They were randomly assigned to the
conditions of a 2 (Imitation; yes vs. no) between-subjects factorial design. We did not
include a no-instruction control group, because previous studies showed that the
effects in the control condition, in which people automatically mimic, parallel the
effects in the imitation condition.
Procedure
Participants watched a fragment from the reality soap ‘The Osbournes’ in
which Kelly Osbourne was the main character. The video was displayed in a
classroom. Beforehand, they received written instructions. Half of the participants
received an instruction to imitate the facial expressions that Kelly would display on
the video, while the other half received an instruction to suppress the natural tendency
to imitate. Both groups received instructions to pay attention to specific movements of
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eyes, eyebrows, and mouth, but one group was instructed to imitate them and one
group not to. Participants were also told to remind themselves of the instructions
throughout the video. Previous studies (Stel & Vonk, 2004; Stel & Vonk, 2005a, Stel,
Van Baaren, Blascovich, McCall & Vonk, 2005) have shown that these instructions
are very effective and are carried out well. So this time the experimenter observed on
the spot to make sure participants carried out their instructions. After the video,
participants filled out a questionnaire (see Materials).
Materials
Video. All participants saw a 5-minute fragment from “ The Osbournes” in
which Kelly Osbourne (the daughter of the family) was mad at every one who was
near her. She shouted that every one should mind their own affairs, that she could
perfectly manage her life on her own and that they had to leave her alone. After
yelling to her companion, brother and parents, she left and went to her room sadly.
Thus, the emotions displayed in the fragment were anger and sadness.
Questionnaire. Emotional contagion was measured by 11 emotion items;
tense, enthusiastic, pleased, worried, irritated, angry, confused, cheerful, dreary,
happy, and sad. Cognitive empathy was measured by three questions: Did you take
the perspective of Kelly? Were you involved with Kelly? Did you place yourself in
Kelly’s shoes?
At the end of the questionnaire, participants were asked whether and how
frequently they watched “The Osbournes”, if they had seen this fragment before, to
what extent they thought Kelly was acting in this fragment and how much they
thought that acting takes place generally in reality-soaps.  In addition, they were asked
how difficult they thought the instruction was and to what extent it had affected their
attention to the video. For all questions, 7-point Likert scales were used. In an open-
ended question, all participants were asked if they knew what the experiment was
about. Finally, background variables were assessed and participants were thanked and
debriefed.
Results and Discussion
All participants carried out their instructions. As in our previous research,
participants rated the imitation instruction as significantly more difficult (M = 4.20,
SD = 1.42) than the no imitation instruction (M = 2.78, SD = 1.34), F (1, 40) = 10.40,
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p = .00. There was no difference between these two conditions on self-reported
attention, F < 1.
Realness
From the 42 female participants, 20 of them thought that Kelly did not act in
the video, while 22 of them thought that she was acting. We included this variable as
a factor in our analyses. 1
Affective empathy
The items of the emotion scale can be classified into three emotion categories:
happiness, sadness, and anger. For each emotion category, we took the set with the
highest Cronbach's alpha. The final set for happiness consist of enthusiastic, pleased,
cheerful, and happy (α = .77); for sadness: tense, worried, confused, dreary, and sad
(α = .81); for anger: irritated and angry (α = .74). 2
A 2 (Imitation) x 2 (Realness) x 3 (Emotion) multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) was conducted with Emotion as a within-subjects factor. Our hypothesis
predicts that the emotions displayed by the target person (anger and sadness) will be
felt more in the imitation than in the no imitation condition, while emotions that were
not displayed are unaffected (happiness). The pertinent interaction between Imitation
and Emotion was significant F (2, 37) = 3.74, p = .03. Simple effects showed that
Imitation affected feelings of sadness, F (1, 40) = 10.57, p = .00, and anger, F (1, 40)
=7.84, p = .01, and not feelings of happiness F < 1. So when facial expressions were
imitated, more emotions were caught than in the no imitation condition. Table 4.1
presents cell means and contrast tests.
Table 4.1. Means and standard deviations of perceivers’ feelings of happiness,
sadness and anger by Imitation (1 = totally not, 7 = very strong).
Imitation Emotions
happiness
M           SD
sadness
M           SD
anger
M           SD
imitation 2.78a 1.18 3.51a 1.07 3.90 a 1.71
no imitation 3.12 a 1.32 2.41 b 1.04 2.61 b 1.25
total 3.00 1.27 2.80 1.17 3.07 1.54
Note Means with noncommon subscripts differ significantly (p < .05) within
each column.
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We also predicted that this effect would occur only among participants who
perceived the emotions as real. However, the three-way interaction with Realness was
nonsignificant, F (2, 37) = 1.23, p = .31. So when expressions were imitated,
participants caught more emotions than when not imitating expressions, regardless
whether the emotions were assumed to be real or not.
Cognitive empathy
Cronbach's alpha for the three questions across the present two studies about
cognitive empathy was .86. A 2 (Imitation) x 2 (Realness) ANOVA was conducted on
this scale. There was a main effect of Realness, F (1, 38) = 4.63, p = .04; participants
took less perspective in general when they thought emotions were acted (M = 3.47,
SD = 1.21) than real (M = 4.03, SD = 1.16). This effect was qualified by Imitation, so
this time, the predicted interaction between Imitation and Realness was significant, F
(1, 38) = 4.39, p = .04. Simple effects showed that Imitation affected cognitive
empathy when participants thought the expressed emotions were real, F (1, 18) =
6.06, p = .02; when these ‘real’ emotional expressions were imitated, participants took
more perspective of the target (M = 4.81, SD = 1.17) than when expressions were not
imitated (M = 3.62, SD = 0.96). This imitation effect was absent when participants
thought that the expressed emotions were acted (M = 3.25, SD = 1.55 vs. M = 3.60,
SD = 1.01, F < 1). Means and contrast tests are presented in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2. Means and standard deviations on cognitive empathy by Imitation
and Realness (the higher the scores, the more perspective is taken).
Realness of expressed
emotions
imitation cognitive empathy
M           SD
imitation 4.81 a 1.17real
no imitation 3.62 b 0.96
imitation 3.25 b 1.55acted
no imitation 3.60 b 1.01
Note Means with noncommon subscripts differ significantly (p < .05) within
each column.
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So the effect of imitation on cognitive empathy depended on whether emotions
were seen as real or not; imitation led to more perspective taking when emotions were
assumed to be real. In contrast, when the fragment was seen as acted, imitation had no
effect.
Study 4.2
In Study 4.1, we found that cognitive empathy is only enhanced by imitation
when emotions are seen as real, whereas imitation enhances affective empathy
regardless of the perceived realness of the emotions. In Study 4.2, we tested whether
these differential results are reliable and whether they are truly due to effects of
perceived authenticity. In Study 4.1, realness was not directly manipulated, so it is
possible that other differences between believers vs. non-believers are responsible for
the effect. In a subsequent study we attempted to manipulate Realness directly using
the same video, but this was not effective; participants already had strong opinions
about the realness of The Osbournes. Therefore, we decided to use a video from our
earlier studies, in which a young woman acted that she was talking with her therapist.
In these studies, participants never questioned the realness of the video and the
displayed emotions. Because participants were not familiar with the main character,
they could not have an opinion beforehand about authenticity. This way, perceived
realness was easy to manipulate.
We expect to replicate the results of Study 4.1; more emotions will be caught
when expressions are imitated than when not imitated, regardless of Realness
(Hypothesis 1). Because the emotions expressed on this particular video are sadness
only, we thus expect that imitation enhances feelings of sadness, not anger or joy. In
addition, we predict that imitation leads to more cognitive empathy compared to no
imitation when emotions are seen as real, but not when they are seen as acted
(Hypothesis 2).
Method
Participants and design
Participants were 83 (21 male and 62 female) students at the Radboud
University Nijmegen. Their age ranged from 17 to 27 years, with an average of 20.4.
They participated for payment (€ 1, -). They were randomly assigned to the conditions
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of a 2 (Imitation; yes vs. no) x 2 (Realness; yes vs. no) between-subjects factorial
design. Males and females were counterbalanced across conditions.
Procedure and Materials
The experiment was conducted individually. All participants saw a film of
three-and-a-half minutes of a young woman (an actress) named Marije, who was
allegedly talking with her therapist. Participants were told that they would see
fragments of the therapy session, in which the questions and comments by the
therapist had been cut from the video. The video consisted of four fragments. The
target talked about finding out that her father had Parkinson’s disease; her facial
expression was sad. She did not cry, but at the end she was not far from it and was
suppressing her tears. The camera position was static; only the face and part of the
shoulders were visible.
Participants in the ‘real’ condition were told that they would see fragments of
a woman in therapy. We asked them to sign a consent form stating that they would
treat the information strictly confidentially. This procedure was used before
successfully (Stel & Vonk, 2004). Participants in the ‘acting’ condition were told that
the woman on the video was an actress and that the video had been made for teaching
purposes.
In all other aspects, this study was the same as Study 4.1, except that specific
questions about “The Osbournes” were left out. We included a question as to whether
the video was real or acted.
Results and Discussion
All participants correctly carried out the imitation instructions. The Realness
manipulation succeeded; none of the participants in the realness condition thought the
emotions were acted, and none in the acting condition thought they were real
(although some stated that the woman acted really well).
Again, participants in imitation conditions rated the imitation instruction as
significantly more difficult (M = 4.33, SD = 1.86) than in no imitation conditions (M =
3.48, SD = 1.74) F (1, 81) = 4.61, p = .03, and there was no difference between these
two conditions on self-reported attention, F < 1.
Affective empathy
The items of the emotion scale were classified as in Study 4.1. A 2 (Imitation)
x 2 (Realness) x 3 (Emotion) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was
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conducted with Emotion as a within-subjects factor. Confirming hypothesis 1, the
interaction between Imitation and Emotion was significant, F (2, 78) = 6.19, p = .00.
Simple effects showed that Imitation affected feelings of sadness F (1, 81) = 11.07, p
= .00, i.e. feelings that were in fact expressed on this video, and not feelings of
happiness and anger, Fs < 1, i.e., feelings that were not expressed. So when facial
expressions were imitated, emotional contagion was stronger than in no imitation
conditions. As in Study 4.1, this effect was not qualified by Realness, F < 1. Table 4.3
presents cell means and contrast tests.
Table 4.3. Means and standard deviations of perceivers’ feelings of happiness,
sadness and anger by Imitation (1 = totally not, 7 = very strong).
Imitation Emotions
happiness
M           SD
sadness
M           SD
anger
M           SD
imitation 2.73a 0.93 4.17a 1.28 2.41 a 1.30
no imitation 2.61 a 1.01 3.27 b 1.17 2.50 a 1.28
total 2.67 0.97 3.73 1.30 2.45 1.28
Note Means with noncommon subscripts differ significantly (p < .05) within
each column.
Cognitive empathy
A 2 (Imitation) x 2 (Realness) ANOVA on the cognitive empathy scale
showed a main effect of Imitation, F (1, 79) = 11.08, p = .00: When expressions were
imitated, participants reported more perspective taking (M = 4.57, SD = 1.04) than
when expressions were not imitated (M = 3.68, SD = 1.33). As predicted by
Hypothesis 2, this main effect was qualified by Realness, F (1, 79) = 4.72, p = .03:
When participants perceived the video as real, imitation affected cognitive empathy, F
(1, 42) = 18.67, p = .00; participants could more easily take perspective when they
imitated than they did not. In contrast, imitation did not affect cognitive empathy
when participants thought that the emotions were acted, F < 1. Means and contrast
tests are presented in Table 4.4. The main effect of Realness on cognitive empathy in
Study 4.1 was not replicated F (1, 79) = 1.41, p = .24.
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Table 4.4. Means and standard deviations on cognitive empathy by Imitation
and Realness (the higher the scores, the more perspective is taken).
Realness of expressed
emotions
imitation cognitive empathy
M           SD
imitation 4.70 a 0.89real
no imitation 3.29 b 1.24
imitation 4.44 a 1.18acted
no imitation 4.15 a 1.32
Note Means with noncommon subscripts differ significantly (p < .05) within
each column.
Thus, as in Study 4.1, the effect of imitation on cognitive empathy depended
on whether emotions were seen as real or not: When emotions were seen as real,
imitation produced more cognitive empathy compared to no imitation, but this effect
did not emerge when emotions were assumed to be acted.
General Discussion
The results of Study 4.1 showed that imitating facial expressions induced more
affective empathy, regardless of the perceived realness of the emotions. The effect of
imitation on cognitive empathy, however, depended on perceived realness;
participants who imitated emotional expressions that were assumed to be real
experienced more cognitive empathy than participants who did not imitate, whereas
imitation did not affect cognitive empathy when emotions were seen as acted. Study
4.2 replicated these effects, using an experimental manipulation of Realness, thereby
ruling out the possibility that the differential effects of imitation were produced by
specific characteristics of believers.
With regard to perspective taking, there is a difference between the studies;
participants could more easily take perspective of the woman in Study 4.2 than of
Kelly Osbourne in Study 4.1. This is not surprising: In Study 4.1, Kelly Osbourne
starts to yell and call names to everyone straight from the beginning of the fragment,
making the impression that she unreasonable and aggressive, whereas the young
woman in Study 4.2 talks sadly about her father having Parkinson’s disease, and
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appears reasonable. As a consequence, it is probably easier to identify with the
woman in Study 4.2.
This may also explain another difference between the two studies: the
interaction effect of Imitation and Realness on perspective taking has a different
pattern. In Study 4.1, participants took more perspective of the target when imitating
emotional expressions that were assumed to be real. This cell differs from the other
three (see Table 4.2). So in Study 4.1, imitation of real emotions enhanced empathy,
compared with the other conditions. In Study 4.2, on the other hand, the deviating cell
is the no imitation / real emotions condition (see Table 4.4): no imitation reduced
cognitive empathy. These differences may simply be due to the use of different actors
with different facial and expressive characteristics.
Apart from these differences, the general effects and conclusions from both
studies are the same. Both studies replicated imitation effects found in previous
studies (Stel & Vonk, 2004, 2005b; Stel et al., 2005); imitation of emotional
expressions produced more affective and cognitive empathy compared to no imitation.
However, when these emotional expressions were perceived as unreal, imitation only
affects affective and not cognitive empathy.  In addition, the data indicate that the
effects of imitation on affective empathy were not just a matter of mood contagion,
but were emotion-specific: in Study 4.1, the target showed sadness and anger, and
these emotions were more strongly felt by perceivers who imitated; in Study 4.2
sadness was shown and only this emotion was affected by imitation. We already
showed that contagion is emotion-specific (Stel & Vonk, 2004), the present studies
demonstrate this is also the case when emotions are acted.
As in our previous study (Stel & Vonk, 2004), we have no indication that load
effects can account for the effects obtained in our studies. Other competing
explanations (e.g., that participants in the imitation condition received more detailed
information about the facial expressions compared to no imitation, that the effects
were due to demand characteristics or mood) have also been ruled out by previous
studies (Stel & Vonk, 2004, 2005a).
The differential effect of Realness on the effect of imitation on affective
versus cognitive empathy possibly sheds light on the different nature of these two
types of empathy. The effect of imitation on cognitive empathy may be less automatic
than on affective empathy, and may only emerge when it is functional, because taking
perspective requires cognitive effort. When emotions are real, this effort is useful,
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because perspective taking facilitates understanding, as was demonstrated by Stel and
Vonk (2004). However, when emotions are acted, the function of perspective taking is
reduced, and imitation does not affect perspective taking anymore. More generally, as
we have argued previously, effects of imitation may only occur in situations where
imitation has social benefits.
In contrast, the imitation-affective empathy link may be more automatic: the
effect of imitation on emotional contagion does not require any effort and emerges
regardless of 'higher' cognitive considerations. This is in line with the ideas of
Hatfield, Cacioppo & Rapson (1992), who called this form of contagion primitive
emotional contagion and assumed this form to be relatively automatic, unintentional,
uncontrollable and largely unconscious. Because humans are social animals, it seems
reasonable to assume that some social processes are so rudimentary and 'wired in' in
the course of evolution, that they cannot be disrupted. Because of its great benefits in
social interaction, the imitation-emotional contagion link is very likely an excellent
illustration of this.
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Endnotes
1 We collapsed this variable to a binary acting/not acting variable to make the
results of Study 1 comparable to the results of Study 2.
2The alpha’s of affective and cognitive empathy reported here are based on the
combined data of the two studies in this paper.
Chapter 5
When mimicry has negative effects for bonding
processes 
Both folk- and research psychologists generally assume that mimicry and
prosocial or sociopetal feelings have a positive relationship.  However, this correlation
is surprisingly bereft of theoretical explanation and supporting evidence, leaving the
conditions under which mimicry occurs and its functional or strategic value
unexplained.
We propose that functionality and role link mimicry and liking. Regarding the
former, we hypothesized that mimicking people we dislike is dysfunctional (unless we
do so in an intentionally mocking way), and should therefore reduce the automatic
tendency to mimic. Although some indirect evidence supports this notion (McHugo,
Lanzetta, & Bush, 1991; Gump & Kulik, 1997), to the best of our knowledge, causal
experimental evidence does not exist. In Study 5.1 and 5.2, we investigated whether a
priori liking for an individual increases the degree of mimicking of that individual. In
Study 5.3 and 5.4, we investigated the moderating roles of functionality and role on
the mimicry-liking link.  We hypothesized that intentional or forced mimicry should
not increase one’s liking for disliked targets. However, we also hypothesized that such
dysfunctionality only applies to the active mimicker in that situation rather than the
target. Hence, we hypothesized that mimicry functions to increase the liking of the
mimicker by the mimicked person but not vice versa.
Mimicry is related to enhanced positive or prosocial feelings. In a prosocial
state, one feels empathic towards other people, has more positive impressions of
others, and enjoys easier interactions, a constellation of behaviors that can be regarded
as sociopetal and to the benefit of the interaction parties.  Concerning the relationship
between mimicry and prosocial feelings, Chartrand and Bargh (1999) reported that
when individuals mimic the postures of others, mimicry increases liking for the target
and fosters smooth, harmonious interactions. Regarding facial mimicry, Stel and
Vonk (2004) showed that facial mimicry results in more empathy and bonding
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towards the target. In addition, mimicry not only influences prosocial feelings, but
also has beneficial consequences for social interactions (Van Baaren, Holland,
Kawakami, & Van Knippenberg, 2004).
However, just as mimicry can influence liking, liking can influence mimicry,
an issue unexamined in the literature.  Only correlations between mimicry and liking
(Bernieri, 1988; LaFrance, 1979) or effects of mimicry on liking (Chartrand & Bargh,
1999; Stel & Vonk, 2004) have been investigated.
Here, we sought to alleviate this deficit by creating a general research program
in which we could: first, systematically manipulate liking of an individual towards
another and measure the individuals mimicry of that person; and, second, manipulate
and cross liking/disliking with mimicry as independent variables. In the first two
studies, we investigated whether a priori liking for an individual increases the degree
of mimicking that individual. In the last two studies, we investigated the moderating
roles of functionality and role on the mimicry-liking link. Because bonding with
disliked others is dysfunctional, mimicry should not increase liking for such others.
However, we argue that this dysfunctionality only applies to the active mimicker in
the situation rather than the target. In Study 5.4, we created a situation with
asymmetrical functions of mimicry; that is, where mimicry should function to
increase the liking of the mimicker for the mimicked person but not vice versa.
In Study 5.1, we manipulated a priori liking and measured the amount of
mimicry. We hypothesized that participants would mimic a target’s facial expressions
more when the target is liked than when disliked (Hypothesis 1). To determine
whether the results also apply to situations were participants have naturally formed a
priori affect toward others, we conducted Study 5.2 in which we measured mimicry
towards unknown targets who were or were not members of a negatively stereotyped
group.
In the first two studies, mimicry should be functional because it should a
positive or prosocial relationship. However, we argue that functionality in a strategic
sense can moderate the relationship between mimicry and other prosocial feelings. In
a study suggestive of this moderation, Stel and Vonk (2004, 2005a) demonstrated a
link between mimicry and emotional contagion. Emotional contagion is defined as
experiencing the emotions of other people, an affective form of empathy. Stel & Vonk
used experimental materials (5-minute videos and interactions) that were sufficient to
produce affective empathy towards the mimicked person. In these situations, empathy
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serves a function; people have a need to understand other people’s feelings and to
belong to others (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). In situations in which being empathic
does not serve a function, for instance when presented photographs or very short
video fragments (15 seconds), mimicry was not causally related to empathy (Gump &
Kulik, 1997; Blairy, Herrera, & Hess, 1999; Hess & Blairy, 2001).
As we have argued above, liking should not be enhanced by mimicry in
situations when enhanced liking is dysfunctional. It is typically dysfunctional to create
bonds with disliked people. Hence, mimicry should not enhance liking for disliked
others compared to liked others (Hypothesis 2). Consequently, functionality is
expected to moderate the relationship between mimicry and liking. This will be tested
our third study.
An additional question is whether functionality moderates the effects of
mimickers who mimic targets who dislike them. Argyle and Dean’s (1965) argued
that when someone is prevented from making adjustments in nonverbal behaviors in
one dimension, veridical affect is shown in a dimension in which there is no
restriction. We expect that people adjust their mimicry behavior when disliking
someone (see hypothesis 1). However, when participants are asked to mimic a
disliked person, they cannot adjust their nonverbal behavior (reduction of mimicry),
and therefore should show an increase in negative affect in a different dimension
(liking). However, when people are mimicked and not asked to refrain from adjusting
their nonverbal behaviors towards the other person, no negative affect is created and,
as a result, no differential effects are expected to be found for liked and disliked
people. Based on Argyle and Dean’s theory, we hypothesized that being mimicked
leads to contrasting results than when mimicking another. Hence, when one mimics
someone he or she dislikes, liking for this person is not enhanced. However, when
being mimicked by a disliked person, liking for this person increases (Hypothesis 3).
This rationale suggests that functional moderation operates only for the active
mimicker in a situation. Consequently, role (mimicker vs. target) is also hypothesized
to moderate the relationship between mimicry and the pro-social feeling or ‘liking’.
74 Chapter 5
Study 5.1
Method
Participants and design
Participants were 36 female students at the University of California, Santa
Barbara who ranged in age from 18 to 28 years (mean age = 20.0). Participants
received payment ($5) and were randomly assigned to the liking conditions.
Procedure
Participants were run individually. Participants were told that they would
watch a Dutch television program without sound in which people are confronted
about their positive and negative behaviors by the program host (see Materials). This
video was chosen so that liking of the targets (characters in the video) could be easily
manipulated via background information provided before the video screening.
Participants watched the video, while we continuously recorded a multiplicity
facial movements and tracked coordinates of facial landmarks (e.g., lips, eyes, etc.)
via a video camera and an apparatus and software designed to do so automatically
(see below). Participants were told that we were tracking their eye movements in
order to investigate what aspects of the video caught their attention. Participants were
instructed to attend continuously to the video. Afterwards, all participants completed
various questionnaires and finally were debriefed about the actual purpose of the
study and were asked if we could use their facial data. All complied.
Materials
Video. Participants saw three video segments, totaling one minute, of a young
woman (an actress). This video had been used in previous studies (Stel & Vonk, 2004,
2005). Participants were told that they would see fragments of a Dutch television
show in which people are confronted about their good or bad behavior, but in which
the questions and comments by the host had been left out. We only used neutral
fragments in which the actress talked but did not smile very much, so that liking for
the actress could be manipulated independently of her facial expressions. On the
video, only the face and part of the actress’ shoulders were visible.
Background information. Background material informed participants that the
video was about a 22-year-old student, Marije, who was in a Dutch television show in
which people are confronted about their good and bad behaviors. Specifically, they
were told that she was invited because of her extreme opinion on helping behavior.
When mimicry has negative consequences for bonding processes 75
In the disliked condition, participants read that Marije was invited because she
did not advocate helping others in need, and that she explained on the video that she
thought it a waste of time to help other people stating that if they cannot survive on
their own, they should not be helped. The also read that the host confronted her about
a specific incident of not helping an old woman that had negative consequences for
the lady; that is, staying out all night in the freezing cold.
In the liked condition, participants read that Marije was invited because she
helped lots of people in need, explaining on the video that she thought it an obligation
to help other people and stating that if they cannot survive on their own, we should
help such people. They also read that the host praised her about a specific incident of
Marije who, despite a bad back, helped an old woman who was stuck in her
wheelchair thereby preventing her from staying out all night in the freezing cold.
Camera. A video-tracking system, Facial Feature Tracker (FFT; NavenVision,
Inc), was used to video record, track, quantify, and record the dynamic movements of
primitive facial features (e.g., lip corners, lip opening, eyebrow movements, eye
movements, cheek movements) on line. The system included a video camera placed
above the video monitor on which participants watched the television show, and
specialized software. The system recorded the coordinates of the specific facial
features every 200 ms. The video fragments were also tracked using this system, so
that the amount of mimicry could be assessed by comparing the facial feature
coordinates of the woman in the video fragment with those of participants.
Questionnaire. A manipulation check was included to determine whether the
background information meant to create like or dislike of the target, succeeded. This
measure included two questions: “Did you like Marije?” and “ Do you think you
would get along with Marije?” Demographic and background variables were also
assessed. Participants were asked via an open-ended question if they knew what the
experiment was about. Finally, participants indicated on a 7-point scale how much the
camera distracted them and if they thought the camera had affected their attention to
the video.
Results and Discussion
One participant was excluded from analyses because of problems with the
sensor-camera. The FFT system revealed that all remaining participants watched the
video without loss of attention.
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Manipulation check
Cronbach's alpha for the two liking questions was .96. A single factor (liking
vs. disliking) univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) using the average scale data
as the dependent variable revealed that the liking manipulation was successful;
participants liked the target more when they received positive (M = 5.26, SD = 1.44)
than negative (M = 2.86, SD = 1.46) background information, F (1, 33) = 24.00, p =
.00.
Amount of mimicry
We quantified mimicry as the proportion of mimicked behaviors out of all
possible such behaviors (i.e., target’s facial movements). A single factor ANOVA as
above, using this proportion as the dependent variable revealed that participants who
received negative background information mimicked the target less (M = 7.54%, SD =
6.23) than participants in the positive condition (M = 17.23%, SD = 11.59), F (1,33) =
9.64, p < .01.
Study 5.2
Study 5.1 supported Hypothesis 1 such that manipulation of liking/disliking
for a target influenced participants’ mimicry of the target. Study 5.2 investigated
whether participants pre-existing implicit liking of a target would also conform to this
hypothesis. Pre-existing liking was operationalized as whether or not the target
belonged to a negatively stereotyped group. Unknown exemplars were used as targets.
Although explicit attitudes can be suppressed when socially undesirable, implicit
attitudes are often expressed via nonverbal behaviors such as mimicry and are much
more difficult to suppress (Wilson, Lindsey and Schooler, 2000). Hence, we
hypothesized that implicit attitudes would influence mimicry; i.e. when participants
are negatively biased towards a stereotyped group on an implicit level, they will
mimic a person belonging to this group less than a person belonging to a group that is
not negatively stereotyped. We tested this hypothesis by quantifying participant
mimicry of a target person belonging to a negatively stereotyped ethnic minority
group, (Moroccan) and a person belonging to a majority, non-negatively stereotyped,
group (Dutch).
Implicit attitudes towards Moroccans and Dutch people were measured prior
to the experiment using an Implicit Association Test (IAT) (Greenwald, McGee,
Schwartz, 1998). In response to criticisms of the internal validity of the IAT,
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Gawronski (2002) provided evidence confirming the convergent and discriminability
validity of prejudice-related IATs; prejudice-related IATs predicted explicit
endorsement of prejudiced beliefs. We expected that the amount of prejudice towards
Moroccans, measured by the IAT, would predict the proportion of mimicking a target
belonging to this group compared to Dutch people. In order to determine whether the
results are due to liking and not to in-group favoritism, additional IATs were
employed.
Method
Participants and design
Participants were 54 (22 male and 32 female) Dutch students at the Radboud
University Nijmegen ranging in age from 17 to 39 years (mean age =21.87).
Participants received payment ($3,-). They were randomly assigned to the conditions
of a 2 (Target; Moroccan vs. Dutch person) x 2 (Order targets; Moroccan first vs.
Dutch first) mixed factorial design. Both targets were shown to all participants
(within-subjects factor), and the order in which they were shown was counterbalanced
(between subjects-factor). Males and females targets were counterbalanced across
conditions.
Procedure
Participants were run individually and were told that the experiment was about
associations. First, participants completed a computerized IAT, measuring implicit
attitudes towards Moroccans compared to Dutch people (implicit attitude-IAT). Two
additional IATs were completed, one measured the degree of positive associations
with self-related words (self-other-IAT) and the other the degree to which participants
felt they belonged to one group or the other (groupbelonging-IAT). Subsequently,
participants performed a 5-minute filler task, after which they were brought to another
room to watch a video on which the Moroccan and Dutch persons were shown.
Participants were told that they were going to watch a video of Achmed and Peter and
were instructed to remember what happened on the video in order to assure that
participants paid full attention to the video. Specific participant behaviors were
recorded during the video in order to quantify mimicry. After watching the video,
participants were instructed to write down every behavior they could remember that
was shown on the video. Next, they completed questionnaires about explicit
stereotypes of Moroccan and Dutch persons. Subsequently, participants were asked if
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they knew what the experiment was about. Finally, background variables were
assessed. Afterwards, participants were debriefed about the purpose of the study and
were asked permission to use their data. All complied.
Materials
The IAT procedure followed the standard paradigm (Greenwald et al, 1998).
The implicit attitude-IAT was developed to measure the strength of negative
associations towards Moroccans. The associative strength between these two concepts
was assessed by combining target dimensions (Dutch vs. Moroccan names) with the
associated attribute dimensions (positive vs. negative nouns), both in a stereotype-
consistent and stereotype-inconsistent manner (see Appendix for target and attribute
dimensions).
The self-other-IAT was a replication of the implicit attitude-IAT, with the only
difference that the target categories Dutch and Moroccan were changed into the
categories self and other. Dutch names were replaced by self-related words and
Moroccan names by other-related words (see Appendix). So self vs. other trials were
combined with positive vs. negative trials in order to measure the strength of self-
positive associations.
The group belonging-IAT replicated the implicit attitude-IAT, except that the
attitudes categories positive and negative were replaced by the categories self and
other (see Appendix). In this IAT, associations were measured between Dutch vs.
Moroccan and self vs. other in order to assess the amount in which participants felt
they belonged to one group or another.
Filler task. The filler task was a large, but not difficult puzzle that took more
than 5 minutes to complete. After 5 minutes of work on the puzzle, the experimenter
entered the room and asked the participants to stop.
Video. The Moroccan or Dutch targets were shown performing routine office
tasks such as answering the phone, writing notes in one’s notebook, and working on a
computer. In one video, the depiction of the Dutch person followed the depiction of
the Moroccan per.  In the other, the order was reversed.  Both actors were
confederates instructed to carry out specific behaviors, which included naturalistic
face rubbing that was clearly visible on the video.
Questionnaire. The explicit stereotypes questionnaire contained questions
about criminality, acclimatization, safety and intelligence, thereby measuring the
amount of prejudice towards Moroccans in general on an explicit level. As mentioned
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above, all participants were asked if they knew what the experiment was about in an
open-ended question. Finally, background variables were assessed.
Results and Discussion
The implicit attitude-IAT
Error trials were excluded from analyses. Response latencies higher than 2000
ms were recoded as missing values and response times were log transformed. An IAT
score was obtained by subtracting the average response time of Block 3 (Dutch +
positive / Moroccan + negative) from Block 5 (Moroccan + positive / Dutch +
negative). Positive scores indicate greater negative associations with Moroccans (and /
or positive associations with Dutch) than positive associations with Moroccans (and /
or negative associations with Dutch), thus indicating a negative attitude towards
Moroccans. The mean score of Block 5 (M = 745 ms, SD = 121.30) differed
significantly of the mean response times of Block 3 (M = 579 ms, SD = 60.66) using a
paired sample t-test, t (1, 53) = 12.45; p = .00, indicating an overall negative attitude
towards Moroccans compared to Dutch.
Mimicry
The interobserver reliability of two Independent naive raters coding the time
of face rubbing was .91. The order of the targets did not produce any significant
effects; hence, the analyses reported below are based on data collapsed across this
within subjects variable. The amount of mimicry of the Dutch target (M = 11.19, SD =
25.94) did not significantly differ from that of the Moroccan target (M = 16.42, SD =
22.80), t (1, 53) = 1.30, p = .20.
In order to test whether the implicit attitude–IAT (Moroccans compared to
Dutch) predicted the amount of mimicry, we subtracted the amount of mimicking the
Moroccan person from the amount of mimicking the Dutch person. Thus, a higher
mimicry score means that participants mimicked the Moroccan person less than the
Dutch person. We predicted that the implicit attitude-IAT measuring negative
associations towards Moroccans would predict the amount of mimicry towards
Moroccans compared to Dutch. A regression analysis with amount of mimicry as
dependent variable and implicit attitude-IAT score as a predictor showed that the
implicit attitude-IAT significantly predicted the amount of mimicry, B = 90.00, t  =
2.26, p = .03; such that, the more negative attitude towards Moroccans, the less the
Moroccan person was mimicked compared to the Dutch person.
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Explicit stereotype and In-group bias
Cronbach's alpha for the explicit stereotyping questionnaire was .80. The
implicit attitude-IAT did not correlate with this explicit measure for negative attitudes
towards Moroccans, r = .19, p = .17. In addition, this explicit measure could not
predict the amount of mimicry, B = 5.42, t < 1. Hence, as predicted, only the implicit
attitude measure predicted the amount of mimicry.
Neither the self-other-IAT (B = -13.41, t < 1), nor the group belonging-IAT (B
= 34.73, t < 1) predicted the degree of mimicry, thereby ruling out the possibility that
in-group favoritism could account for the effects.
Study 5.3
Studies 5.1 and 5.2 demonstrated that disliked or negatively stereotyped
targets were mimicked less than liked or non-negatively stereotyped targets. Hence,
the automatic tendency to mimic was reduced for disliked or negatively stereotyped
targets. In Study 5.3, we sought to determine if intentional mimicry of a disliked
person would increase liking of the disliked person on the part of the mimicker.
In this experiment, participants were engaged in a shooting game. This game
was played in an immersive virtual environment, in which a disliked target and a
neutral person were opponents. We expected that, participants would shoot a disliked
target more than a liked target. More importantly, we expected this effect to be
qualified by an interaction between imitation of and liking for the target such that
when a liked target was imitated, participants would shoot the target less compared
when the target was not imitated and when the target was disliked, mimicry would not
affect the amount of shots. We also expected that the consequences of the liking and
imitation manipulation would be specific for the target, so no effects for the neutral
opponent were expected.
Method
Participants and design
Participants were 53 female students at the University of California, Santa
Barbara ranging in age from 18 to 54 years (mean age = 21.33). Participants received
payment ($10,-) and were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (Information;
likable vs. dislikable) x 2 (Imitation; yes vs. no) design.
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Procedure
The procedures were embedded in two ostensibly unrelated studies. The first
was designed to manipulate mimicry, and the second to measure shooting behaviors.
The mimicry procedure was similar to that of the first study. However, we used a
different video (see Materials) and different background information. After that they
received imitation instructions (see Materials), participants were told that we would
record their facial coordinates while they viewed the video, to determine if they
carried out the imitation instructions successfully. If there were no questions, the
camera was started and participants watched the video. After the video, participants
completed a questionnaire.
After reading the instructions, participants engaged in an immersive virtual
reality game (see Materials) in which the object was to shoot opponents as many
times as possible, while being shot opponents as few times as possible. Participants
were informed what the virtual reality program was about. They wore a head mounted
display (HMD), which consists of a helmet with internal binocular video displays and
devices for sensing the location and head orientation within the immersive virtual
environment. These trackers allow the computer to determine where participants are
looking in the virtual world so that images that change with their position and head
orientation can be displayed correctly via the HMD.  Thus, the game is played in an
immersive virtual world, which was displayed via the HMDs. The gun controller, that
was handed over to them when about to play the game, also appeared in the virtual
world. The object of the game was to hit opponents as many times as possible, while
being shot by those opponents as few times as possible. A virtual scoreboard informed
participants know how they were doing.
Afterwards, all participants were debriefed about the actual purpose of the
study.
Materials
Video. All participants viewed a two-minute video consisting of fragments of
the same actress as in Study 5.1. This time, fragments of a sad video, on which she
talked about finding out that her father had Parkinson’s disease and displayed sad
facial expressions, were used. She did not cry, but at the end she was suppressing her
tears. Participants were told that the questions and comments by the therapist had
been cut from the video. Again, on this video, only the face and part of the target’s
shoulders were visible.
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Background information. The background information informed participants
that the video was about Marije, who was in therapy. In both background information
conditions, participants were  informed that Marije did not have contact with her
father for the 12 years since her parents divorce and that he now appeared to have
Parkinson’s disease. In the disliked condition, Marije was also described as a cold
person, who blamed her father for the divorce of her parents and did not want contact
with him anymore and ignored him even though her father sought for contact with
her. She was also described as emotional discussing it in the video, but that she only
pitied herself for not having a good father. In the liked condition, Marije was
described as a warm person, who did not see her father after the divorce of her
parents, because he did not want contact anymore. After 12 years she sought contact,
although he ignored her all this time. After a couple of meetings, he told her that he
had Parkinson’s disease. The background information stated that she regretted the 12
years she lost with her father, but that she did not blame her father for the loss of
contact.
Imitation instructions. Half of the participants received instructions to imitate
the facial expressions that the woman displayed on the video, while the other half
received instructions not to imitate. The instructions contained specific descriptions
about what to imitate. In the imitation and no imitation condition, participants were
instructed to watch the video and pay careful attention to specific facial movements of
eye, eyebrows, and mouth. In the imitation condition participants were instructed to
mimic these specific movements, while participants in the no imitation condition were
asked to suppress the natural tendency to mimic these movements. Participants in both
conditions were also told to remind themselves of the instructions throughout the
video.
Camera. The same system was used as in study. Again, facial coordinates
were saved every 200 ms. The video fragments were also tracked.
The questionnaire. The same questionnaire was used as in study 1. Additional
questions included ones regarding the difficulty of the execution of the instructions,
whether participants thought they carried out the instructions well, and if they thought
the instructions affected their attention to the video. The questions about distraction
and attention to video due to the camera were also asked again.
Immersive virtual environment technology tracking and rendering equipment.
The location of the participant’s head was tracked using a Worldviz© (Precision
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Position Tracker 1.1) passive optical position sensing system that tracked the
movement of a light emitting diode (LED) positioned on top of the HMD. The
orientation of the participant’s head was tracked by an Intersense© (model IS300)
three-axis orientation sensor. The tracking data were used to render the appropriate
virtual scene so that when participants moved their heads, the rendered scene would
change appropriately. The immersive virtual environment (IVE) was rendered via a
Virtual Research© (Model V8) stereoscopic (HMD) with 680 X 480 dpi resolution
LCD panels with a 60 Hz refresh rate. The horizontal span of the HMD was
approximately 50 degrees and the vertical span was approximately 38 degrees.
Agents and room. The agents (i.e., opponents in the game) in this study were
controlled by a computer program (see below). They had photorealistic heads created
using Biovirtual 3DMeNow Professional© software that fits a photographic image of
a face onto a three-dimensional head mesh. The gunfight exchange occurred in a
virtual room (9m x 3.6m x 3.4m) with two pairs of short walls split off either end of
the room into smaller areas. The gunfight took place across the length of the room
with the participant at one end and the opponents at the other. A scoreboard on the
wall opposite the player displayed the player and opponent scores.  During the game,
participants used a gun controller, which was tracked and rendered in the IVE.
Virtual gunfight software. The gunfire exchange IVE was adapted from one
developed by Persky & Blascovich (in press). During the game, players shot at two
opponents located at the other end of the virtual space. Participants could hide behind
either of two virtual walls to dodge opponents’ bullets. The software for the game was
created in Vizard© 2.0, a software package designed for creating IVEs.
Results and Discussion
Three participants were excluded from further analysis because of technical
problems with the immersive virtual environment technological devices.
Manipulation checks
Cronbach's alpha for the two liking questions was .83. A 2 (Liking) one-way
ANOVA with this scale as the dependent variable revealed that the liking
manipulation was successful; participants liked the target more when they received
positive (M = 5.48, SD = 0.57) than negative (M = 3.15, SD = 0.84) background
information, F (1, 46) = 126.95, p = .00.
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As in Study 5.1, we quantified imitation as the proportion of target’s facial
movements that were mimicked. A one way (Imitation-instruction) ANOVA with this
index as a dependent variable, revealed that participants who were instructed to
imitate the target, mimicked the target more (M = 43.12 %, SD = 15.61) than
participants in the no imitation condition (M = 17.31 %, SD = 10.92), F (1,43) =
46.09, p = .01.
This main effect was not qualified by Liking, F < 1, indicating that the
instructions to imitate or not imitate were not differentially carried out for the liked or
disliked person.
Virtual shooting game
We quantified like/dislike toward the target agents as the proportion of hits,
i.e., successful shots, on the target out of all shots (hits and misses) such that dislike
relative to like would be indicated by a high proportion of hits.. A 2 (Liking) x 2
(Imitation instruction) x 2 (Order) 1 ANOVA conducted on this proportion of hits,
revealed that participants who received negative background information shot the
target more (M = 51,12 %, SD = 7.42) than participants who received positive
background information (M = 46, 83 %, SD = 6.20), F (1, 42) = 7.01, p = .01. As
expected, this effect was qualified by an Imitation by liking interaction F (1, 42) =
5.02, p = .03; when a liked target was imitated, people shot the target less (M = 45.24
%, SD = 7.50) compared to no imitation (M = 48.05 %, SD = 4.96), F (1, 19) = 4.52, p
= .05. However, for disliked targets, there is no significant difference between the
imitation conditions, F (1, 23) = 1.65, p = .21 (see Figure 5.1).
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Figure 5.1. Mean ratings on proportion of hits on the target by 
Information and Imitation (the higher the scores, the more 
successful shots on the target are taken).
Study 5.4
Study 5.3 demonstrated that when participants imitated disliked targets liking
of the targets did not increase. However, the question remained as to whether
mimicking another person increases targets liking for the mimicker. Argyle & Deans
equilibrium theory predicts that when mimicked by another person, mimicry enhances
the target’s liking for that person, regardless of whether the mimicker is liked or
disliked.
Method
Participants and design
Participants were 60 (9 male and 51 female) students at the Radboud
University Nijmegen ranging in age from 18 to 27 years (mean = 21.23). Participants
were paid (€ 2,-) and were randomly assigned to the conditions resulting from a 2
(Information; positive vs. negative) x 2 (Imitation; yes vs. no) experimental design.
Procedure
40
42
44
46
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52
54
like dislike
imitation no imitation
45.24
48.05
53.05
49.33
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During recruitment, participants completed a helping questionnaire, which was
used to manipulate the first impression. They were told that in the experiment they
were going to interact with another person to measure conversational abilities and that
the interaction partner was assigned to them on the basis of this questionnaire. Before
the actual experiment started, participants could look at their scores on the helping
questionnaire, to which an interpretation was added. For all participants, this was the
same simulated score, which described the participant as ‘altruistic 2. Underneath the
participant’s score, the target’s score was also printed, from which participants could
clearly understand that this was the score of their interaction partner. This score was
considerably lower than that of the participant in the negative first impression
condition, which described the target as ‘selfish-egoistic.’ In the other, positive
impression condition, the score did not differ much from the score of the participants,
and the interaction partner was described as ‘altruistic.’
Next, participants received an attitude questionnaire (see Materials) as a
manipulation check of their impression of their interaction partners. In addition they
read two dilemmas (see Materials) that became the topics for the interaction.
Next, the experimenter brought the participant to the room where the
interaction partner waited and told the participant that the interaction would take the
form of an interview in which one of them would ask the other questions about the
dilemmas. Participants were told that these roles would be randomly determined.
Actually, the interaction partner was a confederate, and the participant was always
assigned as the responder. This confederate was trained to interact in a standardized
way and was naive about the purpose of the study. In addition, in the mimicry
condition, the confederate was instructed to imitate expressions, postures, and
behaviors naturalistically, or, in the non-mimicry condition to suppress the tendency
to mimic. The experimenter told the participant and confederate that she would
indicate when the interaction time of 5 minutes was over.
After the interaction, the participant and confederate were asked to fill out a
questionnaire (see Materials) in another room. Afterwards, all participants were
debriefed about the actual purpose of the study.
Materials
Helping Questionnaire.  This questionnaire was a short version of the
Helping-Orientation Questionnaire (Romer, Gruder and Lizzadro, 1986). Eight
questions described specific situations, and participants could choose from four
When mimicry has negative consequences for bonding processes 87
different alternatives regarding how they would react in this situation. The alternatives
differed in terms of the amount of helping behavior; altruistic, selfish-egoistic, self-
preserving and other-responsive.
Attitude Questionnaire. The attitude questionnaire contained 10 questions
designed to measure the initial impression of the confederate; for example, “I think
the interaction partner is a nice person’ and ‘I look forward to the interaction’.
Participants responded on a 7-pointscale from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree).
Dilemmas. The dilemmas described two situations in which the participant had
to choose between two options. The first dilemma described a situation in which a
runaway train would kill 5 people within a few seconds unless it was switched to a
different track in which case it would only kill one person. The participant was asked
what he or she would do about switching the train.  The confederate asked what the
participant would do if the single person was his/her friend, and the other five were
strangers, and also asked what the participant would do when the confederate himself
was this one person.
The second dilemma described a situation in which the participant was
responsible for ‘distributing’ donated organs and was asked when having the
opportunity to save 5 lives, by killing a healthy patient, whether they would save the
lives of these 5 people or not. Additional variants described for instance that all 5
patients were friends and the healthy patient was not.
Final  Questionnaire. The same questionnaire was used as in Study 5.1.
Again, background variables were assessed and participants were asked about their
hypothesized goal of the experiment.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation checks
Cronbach's alpha for the attitude questionnaire, administered  before the
interaction, was .87. A one way (Liking) ANOVA with a priori liking as dependent
variable revealed that the liking manipulation was successful; participants liked the
interaction partner more when they received positive (M = 4.93, SD = 0.43) than
negative (M = 3.44, SD = 0.66) information, F (1, 57) = 62.37, p = .00.
Liking
Cronbach's alpha for the two liking questions was .73. A 2 (Liking) x 2
(Imitation) ANOVA conducted on this scale revealed that there was a marginal effect
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indicating that participants liked the confederate more when they received positive
information in advance (M = 4.93, SD = 0.73) than in the negative information
condition (M = 4.58, SD = 0.75), F (1, 56) = 3.79, p = .06. In addition, a main effect
of Imitation, F (1, 56) = 4.14, p = .05, revealed that when the confederate imitated
participants, they liked him more (M = 4.94, SD = 0.71) than in the no imitation
condition (M = 4.58, SD = 0.76). This effect was, in contrast to Study 5.3, not
qualified by Liking, F < 1. So when being imitated liking is enhanced, regardless
whether the person was liked or disliked in advance.
General Discussion
These studies provide further evidence of a link between mimicry and liking,
but also demonstrate that this relationship is moderated by functionality and role.
Furthermore, we demonstrated that experimentally manipulating liking leads to
differences in mimicry. People who are disliked or belong to a disliked group are
mimicked less than liked people or people not belonging to a disliked group.
Furthermore, we demonstrated that functionality and role-play have important
functions in the link between mimicry and liking. Specifically, we showed that a
mimicker (i.e., the active person in the situation) when asked to imitate a disliked
person did not increase liking for that person. However, we also showed that people
increase their liking for that person when they are the targets of mimicry by a disliked
person, This research, in contrast to prior studies (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Stel &
Vonk, 2004), also demonstrated that mimicry does not always enhance liking; more
specifically when the person being imitated is disliked (Study 5.3).
According to our functional explanation, imitation should not enhance liking
for a disliked person, because it is not functional to create bonds with someone one
dislikes. However, for the disliked person, the mimicker or active person in this
situation, it is functional to increase liking of the target toward himself or herself.
Hence, again mimicry is functional for the active mimicker. Our results support
Argyle and Dean’s equilibrium theory. These theorists maintain that when someone is
prevented from adjusting in nonverbal behaviors in one domain, adjustments appear
in a different domain.  As Study 5.1 and 5.2 demonstrated, people decrease mimicry
toward disliked others. However, when individuals are asked to intentionally mimic a
disliked person, they could not adjust their nonverbal behavior (reduction of
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mimicry), but show the predictable effect from equilibrium theory of an increase in
negative affect on a different dimension.
Such an increase was demonstrated in hostile nonverbal behavior in the virtual
shooting game in Study 5.3. In Study 5.4 people being imitated were not asked to
refrain from adjusting their nonverbal behaviors towards the other person, so no
negative affect was created and, as a result, no differential effects were found for liked
and disliked people.
In summary, mimicry can be an effective form of flattery; previous studies
showed it enhances liking and smoothens the interaction (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999;
Stel & Vonk, 2004, 2005). Here, Study 5.1 and 5.2 revealed that mimicry is also an
honest form of flattery; people who are disliked were mimicked less than people who
are liked. It is not functional to mimic disliked others because the positive circle of
mimicry, creating bonds between people, is not initiated. When this circle is initiated
by intentional mimicry by a disliked person, mimicry even does not improve the
impression of the mimicker. However, mimicking others does help to improve their
impression of an individual even if they initially disliked that individual . Hence, our
functional explanation of mimicry only applies to the active agent.
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Appendix
Implicit attitude -IAT
Dutch Names Moroccan names positive nouns negative nouns
Karel Mohammed prettig (pleasant) boos (angry)
Willem Mustapha fijn (nice) lelijk (ugly)
Henk Ali geluk (happiness) gemeen (bad)
Bart Hassan goed (good) verdriet (grief)
Piet Abdoulah lief (sweet) haat (hatred)
self-other -IAT
self-related words other-related
words
positive nouns negative nouns
ik (I) jij (you, singular) prettig (pleasant) boos (angry)
mij (me) jullie (you, plural) fijn (nice) lelijk (ugly)
mijn (mine) hun (their) geluk (happiness) gemeen (bad)
mezelf (myself) ander (other) goed (good) verdriet (grief)
eigen (my own) jouw (yours) lief (sweet) haat (hatred)
group belonging -IAT
Dutch Names Moroccan names self-related words other-related
words
Karel Mohammed ik (I) jij (you, singular)
Willem Mustapha mij (me) jullie (you, plural)
Henk Ali mijn (mine) hun (their)
Bart Hassan mezelf (myself) ander (other)
Piet Abdoulah eigen (my own) jouw (yours)
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Endnotes
1 There were two opponents in the virtual reality game, the target and control
person. The positions of these opponents switch during the experiment, however the
starting position of the opponents also needed to be counterbalanced.
2 Real scores on the helping questionnaires indicated that none of the
participants had low scores, making this simulated score not implausible. In addition,
none of the participants were suspicious about the scores, nor did they look through
our cover story.
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General Discussion
The purpose of the present dissertation was to conduct a thorough investigation of the
consequences of mimicry within an overarching framework. In order to reach this
goal we looked at the consequences of facial mimicry for the mimicker and mimickee
and its limitations within a social functions approach to mimicry. In this final chapter,
I will briefly summarize the main empirical findings that were described in chapters 2
to 5 and discuss how these findings shed light on the social functions of mimicry.
Then, I will discuss the strength and implications of our findings, point out some
limitations, and give directions for future research.
Overview of the main findings
Part I: On the social consequences of facial mimicry
Chapter 2: Social consequences for the mimicker
The studies described in Chapter 2 demonstrated that facial mimicry has social
benefits for the mimicker and showed how these positive consequences are
interrelated. Participants watched a video of a woman, who talked about an emotional
event. They were asked to either imitate the facial expressions of the woman, not to
imitate, or did not receive any instruction. Participants in no-imitation conditions
reported lower affective and cognitive empathy, understanding, similarity, and liking,
compared with the other conditions. These differences were mediated by actual
mimicry, demonstrating that other effects of the instructions cannot account for these
differences. In addition, the control condition, in which people automatically
mimicked, produced the same effects as the imitation condition. So although it takes
effort to consciously mimic, intentionality does not interfere with these effects. This
also suggests these beneficial effects requires a certain level of mimicry to occur,
which, under normal circumstances, is reached spontaneously.
The interrelations between the effects on different variables were examined by
causal pathway analyses and showed that empathic processes due to mimicry provides
the basis for bonding related processes. In addition, there was a direct relationship
between liking and mimicry, suggesting mimicry start a positive circle in which liking
and mimicry reinforce each other.
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Chapter 3: Empathic processes between mimickers and mimickees
Chapter 3 focused on the role of empathic processes in social interactions
between mimicker and mimickee. In Study 3.1 we investigated whether empathic
beneficial effects of mimicry occur in simple every-day interactions between people,
most importantly whether 2 people actually experience the same emotions due to
mimicry. In addition we tested whether mimicry communicates empathy and
understanding towards mimickees. This was investigated by having 2 participants
interact with each other, talking about an emotional video one of them saw
beforehand. The other participant was instructed to either imitate or not imitate the
facial expressions of their interaction partner. We showed that targets and perceivers
became more emotionally attuned to one another due to mimicry, i.e., their emotions
were more strongly matched when target’s facial expressions were mimicked.
Concerning cognitive empathy and understanding, we replicated the finding that
perceivers could more easily take perspective of the target due to mimicry, which in
turn enhanced understanding for the target. In addition, we showed that targets and
perceivers became more related to each other due to mimicry: both felt closer towards
each other and rated the interaction as smoother due to mimicry.
However, in this study we could not demonstrate that mimicry also
communicates empathy and understanding towards mimickees. Because lots of
additional factors could have reduced the power of mimicry effects in this rich
interaction setting, we constrained the situation in Study 3.2. In this Study we used a
confederate who was trained to act in a standardized way so no other factors than
mimicry could have influenced the results. We showed that mimicked targets felt
more strongly being empathized with and understood than nonmimicked targets. So
mimicry itself not only enhances perceiver’s empathy and understanding for the
target, but also communicates this towards mimickees themselves. In addition, these
mimicry signals were not differentially interpreted when the mimicker was disliked,
showing the strength of those signals. This bi-directional influence of mimicry and
empathic processes brings people closer together and has benefits for social
interactions.
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Part II: Qualifiers on the consequences of mimicry
Chapter 4: When mimicry does not have (in)direct social benefits
In order to investigate limitations of mimicry effects, we examined whether
effects of imitation on affective and cognitive empathy depend on whether emotional
expressions are seen as acted or real. When mimicry is supposed to serve social
functions, mimicry effects should be reduced when it does not have (in)direct social
benefits, as might be the case when emotions are not real, because the social function
to empathize is reduced.  In Study 4.1, participants saw a fragment from a reality soap
about which there was some debate regarding whether the main characters were
'themselves' or were acting. Half of them received an instruction to imitate facial
expressions of the main character, while the other half were instructed not to imitate.
We showed that imitating facial expressions facilitated affective empathy, regardless
of the perceived realness of the emotions. The effect of imitation on cognitive
empathy, however, depended on this perceived realness; participants who imitated
emotional expressions that were assumed to be real experienced more cognitive
empathy than participants who did not imitate, whereas imitation did not affect
cognitive empathy when emotions were seen as acted. Study 2 replicated these
effects, using an experimental manipulation of Realness, thereby ruling out the
possibility that the differential effects of imitation were produced by specific
characteristics of believers.
We argued that these differential effects of perceived realness on the mimicry-
empathy link sheds light on differences in nature of the two types of empathy. The
mimicry-cognitive empathy link may be less automatic than the mimicry-affective
empathy link. So taking perspective via mimicry might take more effort, which is only
taken when functional. The mimicry-affective empathy link, on the other hand, is
hard-wired and emerges regardless of its functions in social situations.
Chapter 5: When mimicry has negative effects for bonding processes
The consequences of mimicry should also be reduced when mimicry has
negative consequences for bonding processes. We argue that is not functional to form
a relationship with someone you dislike, because these relationships will not be
positive, significant, and lasting. Therefore we expected in Study 5.1 that the
automatic tendency to mimic should be reduced when you dislike someone. Liking for
the target person was manipulated and perceiver’s amount of mimicking this person
was measured. We showed that disliked people were mimicked less than liked people.
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This was replicated in Study 5.2, where perceiver’s impressions of targets were
influenced by a group the target belonged to or not; A target belonging to a negatively
stereotyped group was mimicked less than a target not belonging to that group.
Secondly, we argued from the social functions perspective that mimicry
should not enhance liking, the way it normally does, when the other person is not
liked. In Study 5.3 we provided evidence for this; when intentionally mimicking a
disliked person, liking for this person was not improved. While mimicry enhanced
liking for this same person when a priori liked. We hypothesized that whether being
socially functional or not should only affect mimicry outcomes when being the active
person, i.e., the mimicker, in that situation. So in Study 5.4 we expected mimicry not
only to enhance liking for the a priori liked person, but also for the a priori disliked
person. Our hypotheses were confirmed. Taken together, these studies demonstrated
that the link between mimicry and liking is not so simple as it was assumed to be;
functionality and role appear to be important moderators in this mimicry-liking link.
General conclusion & discussion of the main findings
To conclude, in Part I of the present thesis we showed that mimicry creates
special bonds between 2 people; Due to mimicry perceivers feel more empathy and
understanding for the target, which in turn makes the perceiver feel more similar to
and likes the target more. This liking, in turn, affects the amount of mimicry
positively. So mimicry, either intentional or unintentional, starts a positive circle for
the mimicker. Not only the mimickers benefit from mimicry, for mimicry also causes
targets to feel empathized with and understood more. Both targets and perceivers also
feel closer to one another and rate their interaction more positively due to mimicry.
This evidence provides clear support that mimicry facilitates empathic and bonding
processes between people, and thus serves social functions.
In Part II, we take this social approach to mimicry a step further by showing its
some limitations within social situations, namely in social situations were the
functions of mimicry were reduced. We were able to show a reduction in mimicry
effects on cognitive empathy and liking when the function to empathize or to bond
with the other person was reduced. In addition, we showed that the automatic
tendency to mimic was itself reduced when it was less functional to mimic. So
mimicry effects appear to have limitations when being nonfunctional. However there
are two exceptions.
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First, affective empathy was facilitated by mimicry regardless of its functions.
As we have argued in Chapter 4, the link between the mimicry and affective empathy
might be highly automatic and is inaccessible to cognitive considerations. This is in
line with Hatfield, Cacioppo and Rapson’s ideas (1992) that emotional contagion is
relatively automatic, unintentional, uncontrollable, and largely unconscious. So it
seems that humans are built in such a way that they can automatically and forcefully
experience each other’s emotions via mimicry. This can only be disrupted when
people are asked to keep their face from moving. However keep in mind that this
mimicry-affective empathy link, although automatic, is still only present in social
situations. Meaning that mimicry can only facilitate empathy when there is a basis for
empathic processes to occur. This explains why earlier studies could not demonstrate
this link using materials that did not produce empathic feelings, in the way they do in
real life (Gump & Kulik, 1997; Blairy, Herrera, & Hess, 1999; Hess & Blairy, 2001).
They did show more general mood contagion, however mimicry could not account for
this and was probably caused by other automatic modes, such as classical
conditioning or direct association.
We have argued in Chapter 2 that the mimicry-liking link might also be highly
automatic, because there is a direct link from mimicry to liking. However, in chapter 5
this link was influenced by functionality, thus cannot be highly automatic. Though,
remember that this automaticity lies in the link from liking to mimicry, which is also
supported in Study 5.1, showing that a priori liking influences the amount of mimicry.
Whereas mimicry effects on liking are also influenced by other factors, such as
feelings of understanding and similarity (see Chapter 2). So like effects on cognitive
empathy, mimicry effects on liking are prone to be influenced by other processes, and
thus can also be affected by functionality.
A second exception to the functionality rule was situated in Study 5.4; Though
being nonfunctional for the mimickee, mimicry still had beneficial effects; when
being mimicked by a disliked person, liking was enhanced by mimicry. What does
this mean for the social functions approach to mimicry? Does this imply that mimicry
might not serve social functions in the end? As we have argued in Chapter 5, the a
priori disliked mimicker might not get away with this when truly disliked. This means
that when someone talked dirty, or when you have created a negative first impression,
mimicking others can still provide a way out when it appears that you are not a nasty
person after all. So we do not have to abandon the social functions approach of
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mimicry, moreover, this provides even stronger evidence for mimicry to serve social
functions.
Taken together, it sounds like mimicry is a ‘magic’ mechanism that only
affects social situations when being beneficial in those situations; the automatic
tendency to mimic appears not only to benefit social situations, but can be inhibited
when those consequences are not so beneficial in specific situations. Moreover, when
intentionally mimicking in those situations, the mechanism that is normally started via
mimicry (also when intentionally mimicking) fails to have its effects. But why, what
kind of mechanism could be responsible for this magic? This mechanism probably
would have something to do with engaging in unnatural behavior, thus in intentionally
not mimicking when it would be functional to mimic (Chapters 2 to 5), or
intentionally mimicking others when it is nonfunctional (Chapters 4 and 5). Note that
our findings cannot be explained by enhanced negative effect that might result from
this unnatural engagement; In Part I we showed that effects emerged regardless of the
emotions that were felt (Study 2.1 & 3.1), and that mood effects could not account for
the results (Study 3.2).
Alternatively, behaving unnaturally might cause some internal signal to
unconsciously compensate for the effects of this behavior. In line with Argyle and
Dean (1965), I believe that when deliberately mimicking while this tendency is
normally reduced in that situation, this nonfunctional behavior needs to be
compensated for. The two exceptions to the function rule, that the mimicry-affective
empathy occurs regardless of its functions and that mimicry enhances liking while
being nonfunctional for the passive agent in that situation, also coincide with this line
of thinking; First, compensation for unnatural behavior is only possible when dealing
with less automatic processes. As Bargh (1994) described, one of the features of
highly automatic processes is that they occur involuntary and cannot be controlled.
Thus this mimicry-affective empathy link cannot be disrupted by functionality.
Secondly, a possible compensation mechanism started by an internal signal due to
engaging in unnatural behavior cannot start when you are not engaging in unnatural
behavior yourself. This can explain why the mimicry-liking link was influenced by
functionality when being the mimicker in the situation, thus engaging in unnatural
behavior yourself (Study 5.3), while mimicry enhanced liking regardless of its
functionality when being mimicked, thus not engaging in unnatural behavior yourself
(Study 5.4).
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However, this compensation explanation cannot explain why people did not
compensate for not mimicking in normal situations. Apparently one can downsize
effects due to mimicry, but cannot create things that are not there. So this
compensation explanation provides possibilities, however needs further investigation.
Strength & Implications
Former studies investigated single, isolated effects on the side of the
mimickee, which in retrospect appeared to fit with the social functions approach. In
addition, the focus was on only a small part of the whole process, ignoring a very
important factor of social interactions: namely empathic processes between people.
The strength of the present dissertation is that we investigated the consequences of
mimicry within this social functions perspective and tried to encompass the whole
process by investigating empathic as well as bonding-related processes between
mimicker and mimickee. In addition, by showing limitations of the beneficial effects
of mimicry, we showed that mimicry effects do not appear to be as simple and
straightforward as they were assumed to be and also provided further support for the
social functions approach.
Our findings have implications for understanding why people nonconsciously
and automatically mimic. It seems that mimicry fosters interactions and creates bonds
between people. But more importantly, mimicry facilitates empathy and
understanding for one another, which is the basis of positive and lasting relationships.
The present dissertation also gives us some insight into the limitations of
mimicry; namely when mimicry outcomes are not beneficial. In these cases, mimicry
is either reduced, or when intentionally mimicking, its benefits do not occur. Though
intentional mimicry normally equals effects of spontaneous, nonconscious mimicry,
there effects are not maintained in a situation where they are not beneficial. As we
have argued, this is because normally, the tendency to unconsciously mimic is
reduced in these situations, and intentionally mimicking someone in this specific
situation means engaging in an unnatural behavior and probably disrupting the
balance of intimacy, which probably starts a compensation mechanism. So when you
think this intentional mimicry would be an effective tool for you to accomplish things,
you are wrong. For mimicry to have beneficial effects, its occurrence cannot be
forced. Moreover, mimicry is a self-regulating mechanism that does not need to be
controlled, for it occurs spontaneously when useful and is inhibited when not being
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functional. However, our findings do imply that when other people have a negative
first impression of you, mimicking those people does help to get them to like you.
What implications do the present findings have for the debate about the
relationship between facial expressions and emotions? There are two allegedly
opposing views on this relationship. The first is the emotional expression view
(Ekman, 1972; Ekman, Friesen, & Ancoli, 1980; Izard, 1991). Important in this theory
is the so-called facial affect program, which entails that there is a prewired set of
connections between subjective emotional experiences and facial expressions. Thus,
according to this theory there is an innate link between one’s emotional experience
and one’s distinctive facial expressions. An alternative perspective on the relationship
between facial expressions and emotions is the behavioral ecology view (Fridlund,
1991, 1992, 1994; Fernandez-Dols, 1999). According to this view facial expressions
serve social motives, regardless of people’s emotional state. Thus, Fridlund and
others state that facial expressions and emotional experiences have no systematic
relationship. Facial expressions are proposed to arise from social interaction and
should be viewed as communication tools.
Thus, are facial expressions linked to emotional states or do they function in a
more social sense, as a communication device? There is a lot of empirical evidence
supporting each perspective, but both perspectives also have its limitations and
received a lot of critique (for an overview see Manstead, Fischer, & Jakobs, 1999).
Manstead, et al. (1999) proposed an integration of these theoretical positions; they
argued that facial expressions serve both emotional and social functions. Jakobs,
Manstead and Fischer (1999a, 1999b, 2001) and Zaalberg, Fischer and Manstead
(2004a, 2004b) reported evidence confirming this integrated view; variations in both
emotion and social factors resulted in changes in facial activity.
The studies in this dissertation support the view of Manstead and colleagues;
in Study 2.1 and 3.1 we demonstrated that mimicked facial expressions resulted in the
experience of the corresponding emotion, showing a positive and direct relationship
between facial expressions and emotional experience. In addition, mimicry of these
facial expressions also served communicational purposes (Study 3.2) and in general
serves social purposes; mimicry enhances empathy and understanding for each other,
smoothens interactions, and creates bonds between people.
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Limitations & Directions for future research
Although the present dissertation advanced our knowledge concerning facial
mimicry, there always remain questions. As was cited earlier, we need to more
thoroughly investigate the mechanisms behind mimicry effects. We mainly focused
on why people mimic and what the consequences of mimicry are, but not so much on
the underlying mechanism behind this. Though we provided the last step of evidence
needed for the underlying mechanism of emotional contagion, this cannot account for
effects on cognitive empathy and bonding-related process on the side of the mimicker.
So, next to his automatic path of mimicry, there should be another, less automatic
path. This requires further investigation. What we do know is that these positive
consequences of mimicry are due to facial mimicry itself; as we have shown the
amount of facial mimicry accounts for the instruction effects on those consequences.
Whether this mimicry is unconscious or deliberate, the exact same mechanism is
started under normal circumstances. In line with some preliminary data, we expect
that those effects are probably not due to sharing the same expressions, but to actively
mimicking, either unconsciously or deliberate, those expressions themselves. A
possible mechanism that can account for this is simple richer encoding of information.
However both mimickers and non-mimickers are provided with the same detailed
information about the targets’ behaviors, when mimicking others, this information is
perceptually as well as motorically encoded, resulting in more involvement, i.e.
cognitive empathy, with the target in question. When empathy is enhanced due to this
automatic and cognitive path of mimicry, this provides a basis for bonding processes
to occur. When unnaturally mimicking deliberately, both paths should be activated
too, but compensation mechanisms for this unnatural behavior might downsize the
effects of the less automatic path.
Next to mechanisms that cause mimicry to have beneficial effects for the
mimicker, clarifying mimickees beneficial effects needs further investigation as well.
In addition, I question whether mimicry can communicate empathy and
understanding, even when the mimicker does not have a clue what the mimickee is
talking about.
A limitation of the present thesis is that we only investigated the limitations of
mimicry in situations were its consequences are nonfunctional. We need further
evidence that the consequences of mimicry are reduced in other situations where they
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would be nonfunctional. In addition, we did not investigate the power of motivation in
those situations, and the competing motives that can arise in every day social
situations. For instance, what happens when one is forced to associate with someone
they dislike and is very motivated to increase rapport. In this situation one would
expect compensational mechanism to work against unnatural behavior of increasing
intimacy, however it might be functional for mimicry to increase rapport.
Another limitation is that we mainly investigated effects of mimicry via self-
report measures. Although we have already demonstrated that effects cannot be due to
demand characteristics, one could argue that measuring mimicry effects via more
indirect measures would be desirable. At this moment we have already conducted a
study using a more indirect measure of empathic behavior, namely donating money
(Stel, Van Baaren & Vonk, 2005), showing that engaging in mimicry enhances the
amount of donated money. In addition, we are preparing a study using skin
conductance measures. In the future, we intend to make use of more indirect measures
as the one we used in Study 5.3. Virtual environments provide clear and
straightforward methods to measure a lot of indirect behaviors, like interpersonal
distance, eye gaze etc.
In the light of virtual reality experiments, it would be an opportunity to
investigate whether different facial features can elicit more mimicry. For instance, it is
known that status differences between people can influence mimicry behavior (e.g.
Brody & Stoneman, 1985). Additionally, it is demonstrated that different faces may
transmit different levels of perceived dominance (e.g. Berry & McArthur, 1985;
Keating, Mazur, & Segall, 1981; Senior, Phillips, Barnes, & David, 1999). This would
imply that different facial features reflecting dominance would influence the amount
of mimicry. Other mimicry-eliciting facial features need to be explored as well.
Another question that arises is whether our results also apply to other forms of
mimicry, such as mimicry of postures, behaviors, and speech. We have strong reasons
to believe they do. We argue that each form of mimicry causes people to behave more
similarly, which instigate mimickers’ afferent feedback processes and the cognitive
path of mimicry. Though I do not doubt that other kinds of mimicry do show the same
effects, there might be differences between the strength of those effects, probably
reflecting the intensity of the expression that is to be copied. Another related question,
as we have shortly reflected upon in Chapter 3, is whether and how one emotion can
be more easily caught than others.
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Another interesting issue is that facial mimicry is not sufficient to explain
empathic and bonding processes. For instance, in Chapter 2, emotional contagion still
occurred (although reduced) even without verbal information and without other forms
of mimicry. So next to mimicry, other factors need to be addressed as well, for
instance, genetically based empathy, motives of the people involved, conditional
mechanisms. Additionally, it would be interesting to test to what extent previous
associated experiences would affect empathic and bonding-related processes. This
will create a full picture of what goes on in between people in social interactions.
Concluding Remarks
Overall, the current thesis shows that mimicry has social benefits for mimickers and
mimickees; empathy and understanding is facilitated, which creates a special bond
between people. When those consequences of mimicry appear not to be functional in
specific situations, its effects are reduced. This implies that mimicry can be a tool to
regulate people’s social lives, which cannot be forced. However, people catch others
emotions due to mimicry regardless it functions. Implying that people have an innate
tendency to feel into other people’s emotions via mimicry, which can only be
disrupted when losing one’s facial expressions.
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Summary
People have the tendency to nonconsciously do what others do. For instance,
people mimic each other’s postures, behaviors, facial expressions, and speech manner.
From a social approach, mimicry is proposed to serve a function in bonding processes
between people. However, the extant work on mimicry focused on single, isolated
effects of mimicry, lacking a thorough investigation on social benefits of mimicry.
Part I of this current thesis was aimed to provide insights on the social functions of
mimicry by thoroughly investigating social benefits of mimicry and relating those
benefits to each other.
When mimicry is assumed to serve social functions, mimickees as well as
mimickers should benefit from this. Mimickers themselves have never been the
primary reference of investigation. Therefore the examination of this present thesis
began by focusing on the social benefits for the mimicker (Chapter 2). Participants
watched a video of a woman and were asked to either imitate her facial expressions,
not to imitate her facial expressions, or did not receive any instruction. Participants
who inhibited mimicry caught less of the target’s emotions (affective empathy), took
less perspective (cognitive empathy) and reported less understanding, feelings of
similarity, and liking towards the target compared to participants in mimicry
condition. Importantly, the control condition produced the same effects as the
imitation condition. This is not surprising, because people nonconsciously and
automatically mimicked targets’ facial expressions. The instruction effects were
mediated by actual mimicry, demonstrating that other effects of the instructions
cannot account for these differences. Causal pathway analyses on the interrelations
between the effects of mimicry showed that empathic processes (empathy and
understanding) provided the basis for bonding related processes (similarity and
liking).
The studies described in Chapter 3 demonstrated that beneficial effects of
mimicry also occur in simple every-day interactions between people and that mimicry
also communicates empathy and understanding towards the mimickee. In Study 3.1
we investigated whether two people actually experience the same emotions due to
mimicry by having two participants interact with each other, talking about an
emotional video that one of them saw in advance. The other participant was instructed
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to either imitate or not imitate the facial expressions of the interaction partner. Results
showed that targets and perceivers became more emotionally attuned to one another
when target’s facial expressions were mimicked. In addition, we replicated the finding
that mimickers experienced more cognitive empathy and understanding for their
interaction partner than non-mimickers. Targets and perceivers also became more
related to each other due to mimicry: both felt more closeness towards each other and
rated the interaction as smoother due to mimicry. In Study 3.2., we showed that
mimicry also communicates empathy and understanding towards mimickees
themselves; targets who were mimicked felt more strongly empathized with and
understood than nonmimicked targets.
In Part II of the current thesis, the investigation on the social functions of
mimicry was proceeded by examining its limitations. We argued that mimicry only
has benefits in social contexts, in which mimicry originally served its function.
Therefore, qualifiers on the consequences of mimicry were investigated in situations
where (a) mimicry does not have (in)direct social benefits, and (b) mimicry even has
disadvantages for bonding processes .
Chapter 4 examined limitations of mimicry effects in situations were mimicry
does not have direct or indirect social benefits, as might be the case when emotional
expressions are not really experienced, because the social function to empathize is
reduced. Studies 4.1 and 4.2 examined whether effects of imitation on affective and
cognitive empathy depend on whether emotional expressions are perceived as acted or
real. In Study 4.1, participants watched a fragment from a reality soap about which
there was some debate regarding whether the main characters were 'themselves' or
were acting. Half of them received an instruction to imitate facial expressions of the
main character, while the other half were instructed not to imitate. Results showed
that participants caught more emotions (affective empathy) and took more perspective
(cognitive empathy) when imitating expressions. However, among participants who
assumed that the emotions were acted, imitation affected affective, but not cognitive
empathy. These effects were replicated in Study 4.2, in which we manipulated
perceived realness of the emotions, thereby ruling out the possibility that the
differential effects of imitation were produced by specific characteristics of people
who perceived the emotions as real. The differential effects of perceived realness on
the mimicry-empathy link possibly sheds light on differences in the nature of the two
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types of empathy. The mimicry-affective empathy link may be hard-wired and
emerges regardless of its functions in social situations. The mimicry-cognitive
empathy link, on the other hand, may be less automatic; taking perspective via
mimicry might take more effort, which is only taken when functional.
In order to investigate limitations of mimicry effects, we examined conditions
under which, and the processes by which mimicry and liking are related (Chapter 5).
When mimicry is supposed to serve social functions, mimicry effects should be
reduced when mimicry has negative consequences for bonding processes, as might be
when you dislike someone, because these relationships with disliked people will not
be positive, significant, and lasting. Therefore we expected that the automatic
tendency to mimic should be reduced when you dislike someone. In Studies 5.1 and
5.2, a priori liking for the target person was manipulated by providing background
information about the person herself (Study 5.1) or by group membership (Study 5.2).
Perceiver’s amount of mimicking the targets was measured. We demonstrated that
disliked or negatively stereotyped targets were mimicked less than liked or non-
negatively stereotyped targets. Hence, the automatic tendency to mimic was reduced
for disliked or negatively stereotyped targets.
In Study 5.3, we sought to determine if intentional mimicking a disliked
person would increase liking for this person. Because bonding with disliked others is
dysfunctional, mimicry should not increase liking for such others like it normally does
when intentionally mimicking others. We crossed a priori liking/disliking with
mimicry as independent variables and measured liking for the target after mimicking
or not mimicking this target. In a virtual reality shooting game we measured liking as
the proportion of successful shots taken on the target out of all shots. We
demonstrated that when participants intentionally mimicked a disliked person, liking
for that person was not increased, while mimicry enhanced liking for this same person
when a priori liked. Thus, functionality of the effects of mimicry moderated the
mimicry-liking link.
An additional question that was addressed is whether functionality also
moderates the effects of mimickers who mimic targets who dislike them. We argue
that the functionality moderation only applies to the active mimicker in the situation
rather than the target. When people are not asked to intentionally mimic, but are
mimicked, no negative affect is created and, as a result, no differential effects are
expected to be found for liked and disliked people. Thus, in Study 5.4, we created a
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situation, in which mimicry should be functional for the mimicker, but not for the
mimickee in that situation. We showed that mimicry not only enhances liking for the a
priori liked person, but also for the a priori disliked person. This suggests that
functional moderation operates only for the active mimicker.
Overall, the present thesis showed that mimicry serves social functions: First,
mimicry, either unintentionally or intentionally, facilitates empathic processes
between people; mimickers and mimickees become more emotionally attuned to one
another, mimickers experience more empathy and understanding for the target and
mimicry also communicates this toward targets, who feel empathized with and
understood. Secondly, targets and perceivers became more related to each other due
to mimicry; they liked each other more, and felt more similar and closer to each other.
However, when mimicry outcomes are not beneficial, the automatic tendency to
mimic is either reduced or when intentionally mimicking, its benefits do not occur.
Nederlandse Samenvatting
Mensen hebben de onbewuste neiging anderen te imiteren. Men imiteert
bijvoorbeeld elkaars houdingen, gedragingen, gezichtsexpressies en de manier van
spreken. Volgens een sociale benadering is imitatie functioneel voor
bindingsprocessen tussen mensen. Tot nu toe heeft het onderzoek naar imitatie zich
voornamelijk gericht op geïsoleerd bestudeerde effecten van imitatie, waardoor een
volledig beeld van de sociale functies van imitatie mist. Deel I van dit proefschrift
richt zich dan ook op het verkrijgen van inzichten over de sociale functies van imitatie
door middel van grondig onderzoek naar de sociale consequenties van imitatie en naar
de relaties tussen de verschillende consequenties.
Als imitatie sociale functies dient, zouden zowel degene die geïmiteerd
worden, als degene die imiteren hier voordeel van hebben. Imitatoren zijn tot nu toe
niet het primaire referentiepunt van onderzoek naar imitatie geweest. Daarom begint
het onderzoek in dit proefschrift naar de functies van imitatie bij de imitator
(Hoofdstuk 2). Deelnemers zagen een video van een vrouw en werden gevraagd om
haar gezichtsuitdrukkingen te imiteren, niet te imiteren of kregen geen instructie.
Deelnemers die niet imiteerden, namen de emoties van de vrouw in mindere mate
over (affectieve empathie), verplaatsten zich minder in het perspectief van de vrouw
(cognitieve empathie) en rapporteerden minder begrip voor haar dan deelnemers in de
imitatie conditie. Tevens ervoeren deelnemers die niet imiteerden minder gevoelens
van gelijkheid en gaven ze aan haar minder aardig te vinden dan in de imitatie
conditie. De controle conditie liet dezelfde effecten zien als de imitatieconditie. Dit
laatste is niet heel verrassend omdat deelnemers de target onbewust en automatisch
imiteerden. De instructie-effecten werden gemedieerd door daadwerkelijke imitatie.
Dit betekent dat de effecten niet door andere effecten dan imitatie verklaard kunnen
worden. Analyses op de causale verbanden tussen de effecten van imitatie lieten zien
dat empathische processen (empathie en begrip) ten grondslag liggen aan
bindingsgerelateerde processen (gelijkheid en aardigheid).
De studies van hoofdstuk 3 lieten zien dat de voordelen van imitatie ook in
alledaagse situaties tussen mensen plaatsvinden. In Studie 3.1 werd onderzocht of
twee mensen daadwerkelijk meer gelijke emoties ervaren door imitatie. Dit werd
onderzocht door twee deelnemers met elkaar in interactie te laten gaan over een video
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die emoties opriep die één van de twee zojuist had gezien. De andere deelnemer kreeg
de instructie om de gezichtsexpressies van de interactiepartner wel of juist niet te
imiteren. De resultaten lieten zien dat targets (degenen die wel of niet geïmiteerd
werden) en observatoren (degenen die wel of niet imiteerden) meer emotioneel op
elkaar afgestemd waren wanneer de gezichtsuitdrukkingen van de targets geïmiteerd
waren. Tevens repliceerden we het effect dat observatoren die imiteerden meer
cognitieve empathie en begrip voelden dan observatoren die niet imiteerden. Targets
en observatoren voelden tevens meer binding met elkaar door imitatie; ze voelden
zich beiden dichter tot elkaar en vonden de interactie soepeler verlopen bij imitatie. In
Studie 3.2. lieten we zien dat imitatie ook empathie en begrip naar de geïmiteerde
communiceert; targets die geïmiteerd werden, hadden sterker het gevoel dat de ander
empathie en begrip voor hen ervoeren dan targets die niet geïmiteerd werden.
In deel II van dit proefschrift werd het onderzoek naar de sociale functies van
imitatie voortgezet door te kijken naar de voorwaarde voor de gevolgen van imitatie.
We beargumenteerden dat imitatie alleen voordelen heeft in sociale situaties waar
imitatie oorspronkelijk de functies van empathie en binding heeft. De beperkingen in
de consequenties van imitatie werden onderzocht in situaties waar (a) imitatie geen
directe of indirecte sociale voordelen heeft en (b) imitatie zelfs negatieve
consequenties heeft.
Hoofdstuk 4 onderzocht de beperkingen in imitatie-effecten in situaties waar
imitatie geen (in)directe voordelen heeft, zoals het geval zou kunnen zijn in situaties
waar emoties niet als ‘echt’ worden ervaren, waardoor de functie van empathie
reduceert. Studies 4.1 en 4.2 onderzochten of de effecten van imitatie op affectieve en
cognitieve empathie afhangen van de manier waarop de emotionele expressies gezien
worden, namelijk als echt of geacteerd. In Studie 4.1, zagen deelnemers een fragment
van een reality soap waarover op het moment van afname een discussie gaande was of
de hoofdpersonen zichzelf waren of dat ze acteerden. De helft van de deelnemers
kreeg de instructie om de gezichtsuitdrukkingen van de hoofdpersoon te imiteren en
de andere helft kreeg de instructie deze niet te imiteren. Resultaten lieten zien dat
deelnemers in de imitatieconditie meer emoties overnamen (affectieve empathie) en
meer perspectief namen (cognitieve empathie) dan deelnemers in de niet-imitatie
conditie. Onder deelnemers die dachten dat de emoties geacteerd waren, beïnvloedde
imitatie de affectieve, maar niet de cognitieve empathie. Deze effecten werden
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gerepliceerd in Studie 4.2, waarin we de waargenomen echtheid van de emoties
manipuleerden, zodat de verschillende invloeden van imitatie niet verklaard konden
worden door de karakteristieken van deelnemers die dachten dat de emoties echt
waren. De differentiële effecten van de waargenomen echtheid op het effect van
imitatie op affectieve versus cognitieve empathie geven een indicatie dat de twee
typen van empathie verschillend van aard zijn. Het effect van imitatie op cognitieve
empathie zou minder automatisch zijn dan op affectieve empathie en zal zich alleen
voor doen wanneer het functioneel is, aangezien cognitieve empathie meer cognitieve
inspanning kost. De imitatie-affectieve empathie link zou echter meer automatisch
kunnen zijn: het effect van imitatie op emotie overname heeft geen extra inspanning
nodig en ontstaat ongeacht ‘hogere’ cognitieve processen.
Om de beperkingen van imitatie verder te onderzoeken, exploreerden we
condities waaronder en de processen waarbij imitatie en liking (aardig vinden)
gerelateerd zijn (Hoofdstuk 5). Wanneer imitatie sociale functies heeft, zou de
natuurlijke neiging om te imiteren moeten verminderen wanneer imitatie negatieve
consequenties voor het bindingsproces heeft, zoals in de situatie wanneer je iemand
onaardig vindt, omdat relaties met een onaardig persoon niet positief, belangrijk en
voortdurend zullen zijn. We verwachtten dan ook dat de mate van imitatie vermindert
wanneer je iemand onaardig vindt. In Studies 5.1 en 5.2 werd a priori liking van een
target persoon gemanipuleerd via achtergrondinformatie over de persoon (Studie 5.1)
of via de groep waar de persoon toe behoort (Studie 5.2) en vervolgens werd de mate
van imitatie door de observator werd gemeten. We lieten zien dat onaardige of
negatief gestereotypeerde targets minder geïmiteerd werden dan aardige of niet
negatief gestereotypeerde targets.
Omdat binding met onaardige personen dysfunctioneel is, zou liking niet
moeten toenemen wanneer je onaardige personen intentioneel imiteert. Dit in
tegenstelling tot de tot nu toe gevonden link tussen imitatie (zowel automatische als
intentionele) en liking. Dus het intentioneel imiteren van een onaardig persoon zou
niet moeten helpen om die persoon aardiger te vinden. In Studie 5.3 hebben we a
priori liking/disliking gekruisd met imitatie als onafhankelijke variabelen en liking
voor de target na de imitatie manipulatie gemeten. In een virtueel schietspel maten we
liking uitgedrukt in de proportie succesvolle schoten van alle schoten. We lieten zien
dat wanneer deelnemers een onaardige target imiteerden, de liking voor deze persoon
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niet toenam, terwijl imitatie wel zorgde voor toegenomen liking wanneer de target
aardig werd gevonden.
Functionaliteit van de effecten van imitatie modereerde dus de relatie tussen
imitatie en liking. De vraag was nu of dit ook het geval is wanneer observatoren
targets imiteren die hen onaardig vinden. Oftewel, als jij geïmiteerd wordt door een
onaardige persoon, ga je die persoon dan aardiger vinden? Wij beargumenteerden dat
de dysfuncitionaliteit alleen geldt voor de actieve imitator in die situatie en niet voor
de geïmiteerde. Wanneer mensen niet gevraagd worden om een onaardig persoon
intentioneel imiteren, maar geïmiteerd worden, zal er geen negatief affect gecreëerd
worden en als gevolg ervan geen verschillende effecten voor aardige en onaardige
mensen gevonden worden. In Studie 5.4, creëerden we een situatie waarin imitatie
functioneel zou moeten zijn voor de imitator, maar niet voor de geïmiteerde in die
situatie. We lieten zien dat imitatie niet alleen liking voor de a priori aardige persoon
verhoogde, maar ook voor de a priori onaardige persoon. Dit suggereert dat de
functionele moderatie alleen voor de actieve imitator in een situatie geldt.
Samenvattend laat deze dissertatie zien dat imitatie sociale functies dient: Ten
eerste vergemakkelijkt zowel intentionele als niet intentionele imitatie empathische
processen tussen mensen; imitatoren en geïmiteerden raken meer emotioneel op
elkaar afgestemd, imitatoren ervoeren meer empathie en begrip voor de target en
imitatie communiceert dit ook naar de target, die zich meer begrepen voelt. Ten
tweede hebben targets en observatoren meer binding door imitatie; ze vinden elkaar
aardiger en voelen zich gelijker aan en dichter tot elkaar. Echter wanneer imitatie-
effecten niet functioneel zijn, wordt de automatische tendens om te imiteren
gereduceerd. Imiteert men toch, dan vinden de voordelen van imitatie niet plaats.
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